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ABSTRACT. Australia released the newest edition of its Defense White Paper, 
describing Canberra’s current and emerging national security priorities, on February 
25, 2016. This continues a tradition of issuing defense white papers since 1976. This 
work will examine and analyze the contents of this document as well as previous 
Australian defense white papers, scholarly literature, and political statements assess- 
ing their geopolitical significance. It will also examine public input into Australian 
defense white papers and the emerging role of social media in this public involvement. 
It concludes by evaluating whether Australia has the political will and economic 
resources necessary to fulfill its geopolitical and national security aspirations. 
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Introduction   
 
Australia is a significant ally of the U.S. in the Asia-Pacific region and its 
small and highly professional armed forces have participated with the U.S. in 
many military conflicts and global theaters for the past century. It also has 
growing economic and strategic interests in the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean 
regions including China’s rise and illegal waterborne immigration. Incor- 
porating these interests and demographic, economic, and political limitations 
into defense white papers is a perennial challenge for Australian policy makers 
which is exacerbated by it being an island continent heavily dependent on 
sea-based trading and lines of communication.1 
     Australia is a prosperous highly developed democracy which has experi- 
enced significant economic growth due booming natural resources exports 
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though this growth began slowing in 2015 as China’s economy began de- 
clining and due to earlier economic growth declines in the 2010s. Its Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) purchasing power parity was estimated to be $1.1 
trillion as of 2014; its annual GDP economic growth rate that same year was 
estimated at 2.7%; and its per capita GDP that year was estimated at $46,600. 
The Australian economy, whose national population was 24,022,042 as of 
March 9, 2016, exports key commodities including coal, copper, iron ore, 
gold, titanium, meat, wool, alumina, machinery, and transport equipment 
with its largest markets broken down by percentage going to the following 




South Korea 7.4% 
United States 4.2%2 
 
Canberra’s overall trade deficit was $A2.906 billion ($2.019 billion) season- 
ally adjusted as of November 1, 2015. Its key imports include machinery and 
transport equipment, computers and office machines, telecommunication 
equipment and parts; crude oil and petroleum products with Canberra’s 
major import suppliers in 2014 being: 
 
China 20.5% 








Perennial historical challenges in Australian defense planning arise from a 
strong tradition emphasizing landpower in Australian military policymaking 
and the belief of many that Australia’s status as an island nation heavily 
dependent on international trade makes it imperative to emphasize that 
Australia is a maritime nation whose seapower needs must be reflected in its 
national security policymaking plans and priorities. Reflections of this land-
maritime power contentiousness are frequently presented in Australian defense 
white papers and analyses of Australian defense policy.4 
     Defense strategic planning documents have been issued by the Australian 
Government since the February 1946 release of Appreciation of the Strategical 
Position of Australia with supplemental and updated documents being 
produced on a regular basis. A 2012 assessment of Australia’s geopolitical 
and strategic worldview makes the following declaration: 
 
Australia’s area of direct military interest covers about ten percent 
of the earth’s surface. It extends from the Cocos Islands in the west 
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to the islands in the Southwest Pacific and New Zealand in the east 
and from the Indonesian archipelago and Papua New Guinea in 
the north to Antarctica in the south. Other than defending our own 
territory, the most important strategic objective is to help foster the 
stability, integrity, and cohesion of our immediate neighbourhood.  
As successive defence white papers have noted, Australia would 
be concerned about major internal challenges that threatened the 
stability of any neighbouring country. In addition, Australian 
interests would inevitably be engaged if countries in this region 
became vulnerable to the adverse influence of strategic competition 
by major powers.5  
 
Australia Centered Strategic Map Emphasizing its Northern Approaches 
 
Source: Central Intelligence Agency 
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    Australian Ship Reporting Area and Search and Rescue Responsibilities  
 
 
                             Source: Australian Maritime Safety Authority 
 
Australia’s November 1976 white paper was issued during Prime Minister 
Malcolm Fraser’s (1930–2015) Liberal and Country Party Coalition govern- 
ment and by Defence Minister Sir James Killen (1925–2007). Topics addressed 
in this document included Australia’s changing strategic circumstances such 
as the United Kingdom increasingly turning to the North Atlantic and 
Europe as focal points of its strategic interests; the increasing global growth 
of sovereign nation states including Indonesia, Malaysia, and Papua New 
Guinea in Australia’s contiguous regions; the Soviet Union’s declining polit- 
ical influence despite retaining tremendous military power; China’s increasing 
international outreach and engagement; Southeast Asia’s increasing impor- 
tance coupled with Vietnamese unification and U.S. military disengagement 
from Southeast Asia; the importance of the Australian, New Zealand, and 
United States (ANZAC) alliance to the Australia; and Canberra’s need to 





Source: Australian Department of Defence 
 
Self-reliance was a key theme and assumption in this document as the follow- 
ing excerpt demonstrates: 
 
A primary requirement emerging from our findings is for increased 
self-reliance. In our contemporary circumstances we no longer base 
our policy on the expectation that Australia’s Navy or Army or Air 
Force will be sent abroad to fight as part of some other nation’s 
force, supported by it. We do not rule out an Australian contribution 
to operations elsewhere if the requirement arose and we felt that 
our presence would be effective, and if our forces could be spared 
from their national tasks. But we believe that any operations are 
much more likely to be in our own neighbourhood than in some 
distant or forward theatre, and that our Armed Services would be 
conducting joint operations together as the Australian Defence 
Force (ADF). 
Our alliance with the US gives substantial grounds for confidence 
that in the event of a fundamental threat to Australia’s security, 
US military support would be forthcoming. However, even though 
our security may be ultimately dependent upon US support, we 
owe it to ourselves to be able to mount a national defence effort 
that would maximise the risks and costs of any aggression.7 
 
Subsequent sections of this document provided detailed projections of Aus- 
tralian military force requirements, included funding estimates to meet this 
goal of self-reliance in areas such as maritime surveillance, reconnaissance, 
and offshore patrol, naval air warfare, land defense, manpower levels, oper- 
ational readiness, defense facilities, requisite defense science and technology 
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assets, defense industry support, equipment acquisition, assistance to United 
Nations and international partners, and manpower expenditure.8 
     The 1976 defence white paper was criticized as being unaffordable and 
providing little detail on how the government planned to use the force struc- 
ture proposed by this document. A more recent assessment of this document 
contends that it described Australia’s primary strategic concern as being 
adjacent maritime areas Southwest Pacific countries and territories, Papua 
New Guinea, Indonesia, and the Southeast Asian region; extending from the 
Indian Ocean’s Cocos Islands to New Zealand covering almost 10% of the 
earth’s surface; and also noting that the Indonesian archipelago and Papua 




Courtesy: Australian Department of Defence 
 
Although not an official Australian defense white paper the 1986, Dibb 
Review of Australian defence capabilities is another important document ex- 
amining Australian defense aspirations and strategic interests and Canberra’s 
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ability to match these multiple objectives. Written by Australian National 
University Professor Paul Dibb for the Labour Government of Bob Hawke 
(1983–1991), this document was commissioned by Defence Minister Kim 
Beazley in 1985 and released in June 1986. Its contents included feedback 
from the Department of Defence, the Chief of the Defence Force, the Chiefs 
of the Air and Naval Staffs, submissions from state and national governments, 
industry, national organizations, retired officers, and private individuals.10 
Dibb mentioned seeing no need for Australia to make drastic defense 
policy changes maintaining that force structure adjustments can be made 
progressively in the subsequent five years and beyond. Contending that Aus- 
tralia was not imminently threatened, he asserted that Australia should strive 
to develop a more independent combat capability. He stressed the criticality 
of Australia’s close relationship with the U.S. through the ANZUS pact 
providing Canberra with access to U.S. intelligence, surveillance, defense 
science, weapons, and logistics support. This document went on to mention 
that it could not obtain information from the Department of Defence on the 
strategic rationale for a 12-destroyer Navy, three fighter squadrons, six regular 
Army battalions, and an Army Reserve personnel target size of 30,000.11 
     Additional findings and recommendations contained within this docu- 
ment’s executive summary included there being no conceivable prospect of a 
power invading Australia and subjugating the continent; the need for a 
hostile power to take at least ten years and have massive external support to 
invade Australia; that Australia requires the ability to detect, identify, and 
track potentially hostile forces within its area of direct military interest which 
was becoming more feasible due to the emergence of over-the-horizon radar; 
that priority should be given to intelligence, maritime, and electronic-warfare 
forces; and that possessing strike and interdiction capabilities is one of the 
best means for Australia to demonstrate its military advantage. Dibb also 
advocated enhancing anti-submarine warfare capabilities to protect critical 
areas in southern waters including the Bass Strait, Freemantle, Sydney, and 
Cape Leeuwin; that at least two fighter squadrons were necessary for conti- 
nental air defense; that ground forces should protect military and infrastructure 
assets supporting air and maritime power projection; that ground forces 
should be primarily infantry, lightly armed, and air mobile; that Australian 
industry should plan for potential overseas supply disruption; that the Cocos 
and Christmas Islands and Papua New Guinea are the only external threat 
contingencies which should be included in force structure planning; and that 
new capital equipment expenditures may require an addition $A 1.3 billion 
($983.9 million) and that only modest changes need to be made in the Defence 
Department’s plans to increase defense spending 3.1% between 1986–1991.12 
    This document received praise and criticism from various sources. Propo- 
nents favored its emphasis on defending the north-sea air gap to Australia’s 
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north and east and emphasizing placing greater self-reliance in national 
defense capabilities. Critics stressed concern that Dibb placed insufficient 
emphasis on offensive capabilities which they worried would see Australia 
facing an mobile aggressor with hands tied behind its back; that the ADF 
would be overly restricted; could not pose a deterrent; would not provide 
western leadership in the wider Southeast Asian or South Pacific area; and 
would act on a more reactive instead of proactive basis; and that it was 
necessary for Australia to gain air superiority by counter-air operations against 
aircraft on the ground, air bases, and supporting infrastructure.13 
   The following year the Hawke Government and Beazley produced The 
Defence of Australia white paper. This document stressed the importance of 
Australia achieving self-reliance in defense planning and giving Australia 
the military capability to prevent an aggressor from attacking air and sea 
approaches, gaining a foothold on any part of national territory, and having 
the ability to extort concessions from Australia through using military force. 
This document also stressed Canberra’s desire to have forces capable of 
tracking and targeting adversaries by mounting offensive and defensive oper- 
ations including air defense, mine countermeasures, and protecting coastal 
trade with mobile land forces capable of meeting and defeating armed 
incursions at remote locations.14 
 
 
Source: Australian Department of Defence 
 
Additional emphases of this document included stressing development of 
Jindalee over-the-horizon radar with three new stations being planned to 
facilitate around-the-clock surveillance of Australia’s northern approaches, 
expanding naval surface combat ships from twelve to sixteen or seventeen 
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and developing a new warship class with range and armament to operate in 
areas beyond Australia’s geographic contiguousness; acquiring six new sub- 
marines; and establishing the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) as a two ocean 
fleet with major portions being based in Western Australia. The Royal Aus- 
tralian Air Force (RAAF) was projected to have long-range strike forces of 
F-111 bombers and F/A-18 fighters with basing for these squadron planned 
for Tindal near Darwin, Derby in northwestern Australia, and Cape York 
Peninsula. Army enhancements proposed in this document included strength- 
ening the Townsville, QD-based Operational Deployment Force; permanently 
basing major elements of the Australian Army in the north including a fast-
moving cavalry regiment of 340 personnel in Darwin, NT; and increasing 
the number of Blackhawk helicopters.15 
     A 2006 assessment of this document praised its declaration that Australia 
must have the ability to defend itself against air and sea attacks and from 
gaining control of territory.16 However, a 1990 analysis of the 1987 defence 
white paper criticized it for not providing clear costs estimates for meeting 
its goal of Australian self-reliance and for not providing sufficient funding to 
meet these objectives with an estimated budget shortfall of $A 2 billion 
($1.514 billion) over four years, capital equipment expenditures falling from 
27.1% of defense spending in 1986–1987 to 21.5% in 1989–1990, and seeking 
to reduce the number of personnel in defense establishments while hoping to 
increase their productivity.17 
     The Defence of Australia also received criticism from the Labour Gov- 
ernment’s conservative parliamentary critics. Representative Alexander Downer 
(LIB-Mayo) expressed concern about Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev’s 
desire to become more involved in the Pacific and about the white paper’s 
increasing emphasis on integrating with Asia by mentioning that Australia is 
part of the western security alliance and should be proud of its part in pro- 
moting international security. He proceeded to stress the critical importance 
of joint Australian-U.S. facilities at the North-West Cape and Pine Gap, that 
Australia should not worry about whether visiting American and Australian 
ships carry nuclear weaponry, and that the government should stand up and 
resist peace movement arguments promoting moral equivalence between the 
West and the Soviet Union.18 
     The next Australian defence white paper was issued in November 1994 
by Prime Minister Paul Keating’s Labour Party Government and Defence 




Source: Australian Department of Defence 
 
Defending Australia stressed how the Cold War’s conclusion had ended the 
threat of war between the U.S. and former Soviet Union as a threat to 
Australian security. It went on to emphasize that while Australian security 
could still be threatened by European and Middle East events, that there was 
greater likelihood of Australian security being threatened by Asia-Pacific 
developments. Defending Australia noted that the Korean Peninsula and 
South Asia remained areas of international tension and potential conflict, 
acknowledged the presence of competing nations and territorial claims in the 
South China Sea; and that despite repression in countries such as Cambodia 
stable Asia-Pacific strategic relations and economic growth has enabled coun- 
tries to evolve on a more stable basis.19 
     Specific commitments to enhancing Canberra’s military capability made 
in this document included making defense spending 2% of Australian GDP 
for five years beginning in 1996–1997 without providing program specific 
expenditure estimates; beginning planning of potential defense needs until 
2010; strengthening northern barrier defense capabilities, stressing the in- 
creasing importance of the Asia-Pacific region to Australian strategic interests 
while enhancing security ties with the U.S.; including specific quantitative 
measurements for ADF branches such as 11 destroyers and frigates and 6 
Collins Class submarines for the RAN; 103 Leopard 1A3 tanks and 771 M113 
armored vehicles for the Australian Army, and 3 tactical fighter squadrons 
with 52 F/A-18 aircraft and 2 strike reconnaissance squadrons with 17 
F111C aircraft, and two maritime patrol squadrons with 19 P3C aircraft for 
the RAAF.20 
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   A positive critique of Defending Australia noted that Australia would have 
to pay enhanced attention to short-warning conflicts which may require 
potential deployment of Australian forces to contiguous geographic regions.  
It also noted that this document’s guidance to ADF forces being provided 
with sufficient numbers and ability to be deployed regionally was restricted 
by “regional interests” being expanded from the immediate neighborhood to 
the broader Asia-Pacific region.21 Additional praise for this document was 
found in its plans to expand regional security partnership with Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries including Indonesia, Malaysia, 
and Singapore along with Canberra’s plans to support international peace- 
keeping missions in areas as varied as the Persian Gulf, Namibia, Cambodia, 
Somalia, Rwanda, and the South Pacific.22  
     Criticism of Defending Australia was provided in parliamentary debate 
on December 7, 1994 by opposition defense critic Peter Reith (Lib-Flinders).  
He noted what he saw as a decline in capabilities and operational and per- 
sonnel readiness under the Labour Government commenting that since a 1991 
force structure review that the Army had lost two of six infantry battalions 
and that Defending Australia proposed restoring one of these battalions by 
stripping manpower from other depleted ADF assets which he described as 
robbing Peter to pay Paul when Paul is already impoverished. He also criti- 
cized Labour’s plans to extend strategic horizons to from Southeast Asia to 
Northeast Asia as rhetoric which cannot be backed up with effective action.23 
     1996 saw the end of 13 years of Labour Party Government with the 
election of the conservative coalition of the Liberal and National parties.  
Led by Prime Minister John Howard (1996–2007) (LIB-Bennelong) and 
Defence Minister Ian McLachlan (LIB-Barker), this government published 
the Australian Strategic Review in 1997. Highlights of this document included 
stressing the global nature of Australian strategic interests while emphasizing 
the importance of basing security on conditions in contiguous countries as 
stressed by this following assertion: 
 
… Australia’s most direct strategic interests continue to include 
the stability, safety and friendly disposition of the countries closest 
to us – the inner arc of islands from Indonesia in the west through 
to Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands and the Southwest 
Pacific. Any substantial military attack on Australia would most 
easily be mounted from or through these islands. Australia’s relative 
safety from armed attack at present owes much to the common 
interests we share with these countries, and to freedom from 




Source: Australian Department of Defence 
 
This document went on to emphasize that key foundational elements of Aus- 
tralian national security included: 
 The centrality of the Asia-Pacific region to our security. 
 The significance of economic growth in East Asia to our strategic envi- 
ronment. 
 The challenge of new power relations which result from that growth. 
 The special importance of the relationships between China, Japan and the 
United States for the security of the whole region. 
 The unique place Indonesia has in shaping our strategic environment. 
 The importance of maintaining, as an integral part of our wider inter- 
national policies, a strategic posture which includes both the maintenance of 
effective defence capabilities and the maintenance of active involvement in 
regional strategic affairs.25 
     Australia’s Strategic Policy proceeded to describe Canberra’s key Asia-
Pacific strategic interests as being: 
 Helping avoid destabilizing strategic competition between the region’s 
major powers;  
 Helping prevent the emergence of a security environment dominated by 
any power(s) with antagonistic strategic interests; 
 Helping maintain a benign southeast Asian security environment, espe- 
cially in maritime Southeast Asia, which protects the territorial integrity of 
all regional countries; and 
 Helping prevent the regional proliferation of weapons of mass destruc- 
tion.26 
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    On December 2, 1997 Representative William Taylor (LIB-Groom) praised 
Australian Strategic Policy for emphasizing the following four priority areas 
for ADF development: effectively exploiting information technologies to 
allow Australia to use its small forces to maximum effectiveness; developing 
military capabilities to defeat future threats to national air and maritime 
approaches; maintaining an effective defense force strike capability; and 
developing capabilities to defeat threats within Australian territory.27 
   However, concerns about this document expressed by Labour Party figures 
that stressed the Howard Government should place more emphasis on remote 
crisis areas such as the Mideast instead of the contiguous inner arc and 
Australian Strategic Policy was also faulted for the ADF’s projected strength 
of 50,000 being insufficient to carry out expanded security requirements 
expected of it by this document and the expected absence of new funds to 
execute its responsibilities.28  
    Although the next Australian defence white paper would not be released 
until 2000, its contents would be significantly influenced by Canberra’s 1999 
military intervention into East Timor. In August 1999, people of this country 
voted to be an independent country and separate themselves from Indonesia. 
Pro-Indonesian militias responded violently by killing pro-independence East 
Timorese and trying to deport other areas of Indonesia. The United Nations 
Security Council passed resolution 1264 on September 15, 1999 authorizing 
the creation of an Australian-lead International Force in East Timor 
(INTERFET) to restore order and provide humanitarian relief to this newly 
independent country. Australian force size in this operation reached a peak 
of 5,700 in 1999 and a Canberra retained a residual military presence in this 
country until November 22, 2012.29 
     Australian intervention and sustainment in INTERFET was considered 
relatively successful in establishing some level of stability in East Timor and 
representing the most decisive Australian regional military intervention in 
Southeast Asia since World War II. It was also aided by Indonesia’s decision 
not to resist the intervention. However, the decision-making leading up to 
the intervention has been criticized as have ADF capabilities in being able to 
execute and sustain such missions including large-scale counterinsurgency 
operations. Additional criticism of Australian participation in INTERFET 
has also focused on the interoperability of the ADF with coalition forces in 
future multinational operations. This operation also forced the ADF to deploy 
nearly half of the Army’s combat force on extremely short notice to face 
irregulars with limited military assets. INTERFET occurred so quickly that 
the ADF had to borrow camouflage suits, night vision goggles, and water 
purification plants from the U.S. due to supply shortages.30   
     December 6, 2000 saw the release of Australia’s next defence white paper 
under the aegis of Prime Minister Howard and Defence Minister John Moore 
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(LIB-Ryan). Entitled Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force this document 
stressed that the ADF’s primary objective was defending Australian territory 
from credible attack without relying on another country’s combat forces. This 
emphasis on a self-reliant strategy stressed developing a maritime strategy to 
control air and sea approaches to the continent by denying them to hostile 
ships and aircraft and provide maximum freedom of action to the ADF. It 
assigned a vital and central role to ADF land forces in assisting ADF air and 
sea forces in implementing this maritime strategy. This document also stressed 
that Australia would take a highly proactive approach to secure a rapid and 
favorable result and end to hostilities. Defence 2000 also stressed making a 
major contribution to securing Australia’s neighborhood, being able to operate 
in adjoining countries if requested by host governments, using preponderant 
force if military action is required, contributing effectively in coalitions to 
international crises in areas far away from Australia, and providing indige- 
nous coastal surveillance and emergency management support Defence 2000 
also stressed a concentric circles security model focusing on a hierarchy of 
five interests and associated objectives including: 
 Ensuring the defense of Australia and its direct approaches. 
 Fostering immediate neighborhood security. 
 Promoting Southeast Asian stability and cooperation. 
 Supporting strategic stability in the wider Asia Pacific region. 
 Supporting global security.31 
 
 
                                  Source: Australian Department of Defence 
 
 Examples of Australian involvement in international peacekeeping missions 
since 1956 has spanned areas as far flung as Afghanistan/Pakistan, Cambodia, 
Namibia, the Sinai, the Solomon Islands, Somalia, and Western Sahara as 




Source: Australian Department of Defence.32 
 
This white paper sought to increase Australian defense spending by $A500 
million in 2001–2002 ($261 million) and $A1 billion ($523.212 million) in 
2002–2003 and increase by $A 23 billion ($17.450 billion) over the next 
decade. Parliamentary supporters of this white paper such as Representative 
Kay Hull (NAT-Riverina) stressed that Defence 2000 detailed Australia’s need 
to invest in deployable defense forces capable of protecting Australia in land, 
sea, and air combat and to upgrade its forces to maintain pace with evolving 
technologies and capabilities. Representative Gary Hardgrave (LIB-Moreton) 
stressed the consultative nature of this report emphasizing how public input 
was sought and obtained for report contents. Parliamentary criticism of 
Defence Australia on February 28, 2001 by Representative Laurie Ferguson 
(LAB-Werriwa) criticized the government for its pre-East Timor intervention 
statement that ADF strength of 42,500 was sufficient while it now contended 
that personnel strength of 54,000 was required. Ferguson also added that 
current force separation rates meant that by 2010 the ADF would be 12,000 
personnel short of desired levels. He also criticized the government for what 
he contended was poor morale in defense warehouses due to plans to out- 
source defense functions.33 
     Defence 2000 also received bracing criticism in many scholarly assess- 
ments. One analysis noted that while this document stressed the revolution in 
military affairs, missile proliferation, failed states, and transnational crime, it 
contained little analysis of the varying implications these challenges had on 
how Australia would manage its complex and changing security environ- 
ment. It was critical of the White Paper asserting that Australia should have 
a balanced and conventional approach to meeting divergent threats.34 
     Another critical assessment maintained that Defence 2000 maintained an 
ambivalent attitude toward Indonesia as a possible threat to Australian security 
if Jakarta would revert to authoritarian rule; that it did not address how Aus- 
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tralia would respond if the U.S. requested it to provide military assistance if 
China attacked Taiwan and consider how China might seek to punish Aus- 
tralia if it supported the U.S. in such a contingency; and whether Australia 
can economically afford to defend itself in an conventional military conflict.  
This writer also stressed that the war on terror was a misleading metaphor 
and that police efforts would be more important than ADF operations.35 
    A final harsh assessment of Defence 2000 argued that the maritime 
strategy associated with this document did not account for what the author 
considered the declining strategic relevance of geography and proliferating 
non-state challenges to state security. Its author contended that Australia’s 
northern air-sea gap could not be defended in a world of technological 
profusion, protean crime, epidemic diseases, illegal migration, and terrorist 
attacks such as the October 12, 2002 Bali bombing killing 88 Australians.  
This analysis also contended that a true maritime strategy to control sea lines 
of communication and contain continental powers was beyond Australia’s 
capability. It advocated that future ADF capabilities should emphasize great- 
er strategic reach and off-shore deployments beyond Canberra’s immediate 
neighborhood to support wider security interests, that the ADF must be 
trained and structured to defend Australia from conventional military attack, 
counterterrorism, participate in complex peace operations, and defend against 
weapons of mass destruction, and that technological superiority must be 
usable and appropriate for new and old wars and that future conflicts will 
emphasize lower cost, modular, multi-purpose platforms equipped with mini- 
aturized missiles and drones, lethal microbots, and various precision guided 
munitions supported by Command, Control, Communications, Intelligence, 
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) and real-time sensor-to-shooter 
architecture.36 
     Australia’s next defense white paper would be issued in 2009 by the gov- 
ernment of Kevin Rudd (LAB-Griffith which defeated Howard’s conservative 
coalition government in the 2007 elections. During the preceding decade, the 
ADF participated in U.S. military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq while 
also intervening in the Solomon Islands to prevent internecine strife in that 
Pacific Island country from causing the collapse of governmental authority.  
Numerous assessments exist on the propriety of these operations and their 
successes and failures.37 
     Prior to issuing the 2009 White Paper, the Rudd Government announced 
on May 7, 2008 that it was directing a formal evaluation of the effectiveness 
of the Defence Material Organisation (DMO) to see that this entity was 
carrying out its mission to provide effective value for Australian defense 
spending, achieve better results for the ADF, greater transparency and 
accountability, and improved efficiency and effectiveness. This review, known 
as the Mortimer Review, was compiled by University of Sydney Professor 
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David Mortimer, and it released its findings on September 18, 2008. Review 
findings included inadequate project management resources in DMO’s 
Capability Development Group; inefficiencies in the process leading to 
governmental approvals for new projects; insufficient DMO personnel; and 
delays due to inadequate industry capacity, and introducing equipment into 
full service.38 
     Recommendations for improving Australian defense spending account- 
ability and efficiency included: 
 Defence preparing an annual submission detailing current and future 
defense capability gaps and their remediation priority for government con- 
sideration and approval. 
 The Defence Chief Financial Officer should assure Defence Capability 
Plan Affordability including its impact on future personnel and operating 
costs as part of annual defense budget considerations. 
 The capability development process should be expedited to allow the 
National Security Committee to focus on major issues and a subordinate sub- 
committee created to handler minor and simpler defense acquisition matters. 
 The Capability Development Group should be sufficiently financed in 
terms of workforce numbers and skills to develop capability proposals and 
incorporate specialist advice from the Defense Materials Organisation and 
Defense Science and Technology Organisation; and 
 The Government should work with industry and State Governments to 
address defense industry skills shortages.39 
     The 2009 white paper Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century:  
Force 2030 was issued by Rudd and Defence Minister Joel Fitzgibbon (LAB-
Hunter) and released on May 2, 2009. Defending Australia in the Asia-
Pacific Century was prepared during the post-2008 international financial 
crisis. One significant change in this document from its predecessors was 
speculating about the possibility of a major power adversary (potentially 
China) attacking Australia while stressing that Canberra’s major strategic 
priorities remained defending Australia against direct armed attack and 
ensuring the stability, security, and cohesion of its immediate neighborhood.  
Defending Australia emphasized a commitment to maintaining Indonesian 
territorial integrity saying a weakened and fragmented Indonesia could 
threaten Australian national security. This document also stressed concern 
about challenges facing the Southwest Pacific and East Timor stemming from 
economic stagnation, political and social instability, weak governance, and 
crime. It also stressed concern of Fijian military interference in the demo- 
cratic process while mentioning ongoing security cooperation with New 




Source: Australian Department of Defence 
 
To address these emerging security challenges Rudd’s Government decided 
to acquire 12 new submarines to be built in South Australia as part of a 
program expanding three decades with these Future Submarines having 
greater range, longer patrol endurance, and capabilities beyond those of the 
current Collins class submarines. Examples of these expanded capabilities 
include strategic strike; mine detection and mine laying operations; intel- 
ligence collection; and supporting special forces with infiltration and exfil- 
tration missions. This document also committed to enhancing Australia’s 
surface fleet by acquiring three air warfare destroyers and a fleet of eight 
Future Frigates. It committed to maintaining an Army force of three combat 
brigades with around 4,000 troops consisting of battalion sized units and en- 
hancing Army deployment, lead time, and sustainment capabilities through 
the Adaptive Army Initiative. The Air Force was slated to benefit from the 
2010 arrival of the F/A-18F Super Hornet fighter and the acquisition of 
approximately 100 F-35 fifth generation fighters, and the Growler E-A 18G 
electronic warfare aircraft.41 
     During September 8, 2009 debate on the defense science and technical 
provisions of Defending Australia Minister for Defense Personnel, Material, 
and Science Greg Combet (LAB-Charlton) maintained that the government 
had given defense scientists greater freedom to design and develop new 
technologies and developing new roles for them in analyzing technical risk 
and designing risk management and risk mitigation strategies to enhance 
defense capabilities. However, MP Bob Baldwin (LIB-Paterson), while ac- 
knowledging what he saw as possible developments in the Defence Science 
and Technology Organisation (DSTO), stressed concern about $A20 billion 
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($16.803 billion) cuts in defense spending with DSTO experiencing a 50% 
annual budget reduction from $A26 million ($21.844 million) to $A13 
million ($10.922 million) and that such cuts would have injurious effects on 
defense workforce health and safety conditions.42  
     Components of Defending Australia were also praised and criticized in a 
series of articles in the Australian security policy journal Security Challenges.  
One assessment praised the white paper for examining national security 
policy objectives out to 2030, for the Rudd Government’s commitment to 
maintain annual 3% defense budget increases, and for its determination that 
the U.S. will remain the world’s most preeminent military power until 2030 
and that no other great power will be able to challenge U.S. East Asian 
primacy in the near term.43    
     A second assessment mentioned how climate change, pandemics, drugs, 
and internationally organized crime need to be factored into national security 
policy planning. It went on to criticize Force 2030 for failing to discuss the 
evolving relationship between hard and soft power as a conditioning factor 
in emerging military operations. This appraisal also faulted this document 
for not emphasizing that successful counterinsurgency operations requires 
isolating civilian communities from insurgents, and providing education, 
health, and well-being to give civilian communities reason to oppose insur- 
gents and that Force 2030 fails to suggest how such solutions can be achieved 
as matters of policy and strategy. 
       In addition, this analyst also criticized Force 2030 for an insufficient 
subtlety in confronting the emergence of ideological conflict in the form of 
Islamist absolutism; emerging and differing forms of national power; the 
acute unpredictability in which cultural, economic, ideological, and social 
forces might interact; ignores the role of culture in strategic pathology; and 
the global strategic system’s vulnerability to individual leaders whims and 
decisions.44 
     A third Security Challenges assessment of Force 2030 faulted it for 
imprecisely defining how interests in Chapter 5 relate to policy precepts in 
Chapter 6 and tasks defined in Chapter 7. Specifically, it declared that Force 
2030 failed to define what are unique Australian national interests, that it was 
ambiguous in determining how interests impact ADF force priorities, and 
that there is major and consequential confusion about whether Australia’s 
strategic objective should be defending the continent against the forces of a 
major Asian power only against forces Indonesia might use. This analysis also 
criticized Force 2030 for failing to mention neighboring countries denying 
access to military bases to potentially hostile powers that this document’s 
emphasis on militarily protecting shipping lanes and sea-borne trade by 
major or middle tier powers is extremely difficult and beyond the existing 
Australian military capabilities.45 
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Source: Australia Department of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet 
 
In October 2012, the Government of Prime Minister Julia Gillard (LAB-Lalor) 
who had ousted Rudd in a 2010 internal party dispute released Australia in 
the Asian Century white paper. This document stressed the increasing impor- 
tance of the Asia-Pacific region in Australian foreign and national security 
policy. National security topics stressed in this document included recog- 
nizing that future Australian prosperity is critically linked to developments 
in this region; that the region’s security environment is shifting in response 
to regional economic growth, changing national strategic power, and the 
behavior of non-state actors; that Canberra will promote cooperative arrange- 
ments among regional nations as the economic and strategic landscape shifts; 
and that Australia supports China’s participation in regional economic, 
political, and strategic development. Australia in the Asian Century went on 
to emphasize that Australia would continue working closely with the U.S. to 
ensure Washington maintains a strong and consistent regional presence; that 
global and regional institutions were central for developing regional collective 
security, building trust, and supporting norms and rules; that the East Asia 
Summit would be a crucial regional institution for managing regional security 
challenges; and that Australia seeks to increase human security by develop- 
ing resilient markets for basic human needs including energy, food, and water, 
and grappling with climate change.46 
     One assessment of this document praised it for stressing that India could 
play a positive role in Canberra’s security interests while urging Australia 
place increased importance on building a strong strategic arc linking the Indian 
and Pacific Oceans. This analysis also criticized Australia in the Asian Cen- 
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tury for ignoring controversies in Australian immigration policies including 
stopping illegal seaborne immigration and detaining immigrants and for not 
addressing North Korean nuclear and cyber rattling.47 
    The next Australian defense white paper Defending Australia and Its 
National Interests was released May 3, 2013 by Gillard who would be 
toppled by Rudd the following month and Defence Minister-Stephen Smith 
(LAB-Perth) and incorporated public consultation in its compilation and 
preparation. It also was issued in the aftermath of an $A20 billion ($20.741 
billion) defense funding loss between 2009 and 2012 due to the Australian 
economy entering into a budget deficit consequently dropping Australian 
defense spending below 2% GDP. Topics addressed in this document included 
matters affecting Australia’s strategic outlook including the Indo-Pacific, 
adverse effects of the global financial crisis, Southeast Asia, and North Asia, 
the Indian Ocean, regional military modernization, terrorism, climate change 
and resource security, Antarctica, technological development implications for 
the ADF, and cyber war. It defined the four key tasks of Australian defense 
as: 
 Deterring and Defeating Attacks on Australia 
 Contributing to stability and security in the South Pacific and East Timor 
 Contributing to military contingencies in the Indo-Pacific 
 Contributing to military contingencies supporting global security.48 
 
Courtesy: Lowy Institute 
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This white paper also stressed drawing done ADF personnel from overseas 
operations in the Mideast, Afghanistan, East Timor, and the Solomon Islands; 
maintaining ADF capabilities with particular emphasis on excellence in con- 
ventional combat operations; ensuring ADF capability development meets 
current and future needs; providing timely and accurate intelligence support 
to ADF decision-makers; and enhancing allied interoperability. Additional 
aspirations of this document included maintaining ADF force strength of 
approximately 59,000; increasing the defense budget to 2% of GDP, provid- 
ing longer warning time of threats to the continent; enhancing force surge 
capability; and dispersing base locations to ensure they align with strategic 
requirements and ensure critical capabilities; that bases be located near indus- 
try and strategic infrastructure; incorporating a U.S. Marine Corps rotational 
force at Darwin; and since 2009 approving over 125 new proposals for new 
and enhanced defense capabilities worth over $A 17.3 billion ($12.347 billion) 
including C-17 heavy lift aircraft, F/A-18 F combat aircraft, Bushmaster 
protected mobility vehicles, and two large amphibious/sea vessels. Anticipa- 
ted future purchases include three Air Warfare destroyers, two landing dock 
helicopter amphibious ships, and two F-35A Joint Strike Fighter aircraft.49 
    This white paper was released a few months before the 2013 election 
ousting the revolving door Labour governments of Gillard and Kevin Rudd 
who toppled Gillard in a partisan battle to become Prime Minister again in 
June 2013. Consequently, this document received limited parliamentary dis- 
cussion. On May 14, 2013 Representative Nick Champion (LAB-Wakefield) 
asked Smith how the defense white paper outlined a plan providing for Aus- 
tralian security. Smith responded saying Defending Australia described the 
formation of an Indo-Pacific strategic entity reflecting the rise of China and 
India; stressed the importance of the U.S.’ rebalance to the Asia-Pacific; and 
stressed that Australia remained the world’s 13th largest defense spending 
country even though this spending represented less than 2% of GDP.50 
     This same day saw Gillard respond to a February 7, 2013 written question 
from Rep. Stuart Robert (LIB-Fadden) concerning governmental spending 
on cybersecurity by noting that $A1.46 billion ($1.389 billion) was planned 
for cybersecurity spending out to 2020 by various Department of Defence 
entities.51 
     Defending Australia would not see further implementation due to the 
decisive September 7, 2013 defeat of the Labour Government by a conser- 
vative Liberal-National Party government headed by new Prime Minister 
Tony Abbott (LIB-Warringah).52  
     Numerous positive and more numerous critical reviews were made of 
Defending Australia in a series of articles published in a special issue of the 
Australian defense journal Security Challenges published by the Institute for 
Regional Security. Attributes of this document mentioned in these articles 
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included recognizing that territorial disputes in Southeast and Northeast Asia 
are directly linked to regional states concerns about Chinese military moder- 
nization; recognizing the need to achieve proper balance between capability 
and risk within financial resources; emphasizing the importance of building 
trust in defense and security partnerships and that such trust must extend 
across governments and societies; praised the U.S. Marine Corps rotation 
through Darwin; indicating that the U.S. alliance may become more impor- 
tant in the future; approved Plan Beersheba which seeks to structure the 
Army into three multi-role combat brigades; and implicitly recognizing the 
need for Australia to have a maritime capability to protect trade and essential 
materials from being attacked at sea; and commending the documents’ 
emphasis on ADF personnel education and training and strengthening treat- 
ment for those experiencing mental health and post-traumatic stress.  Another 
journal’s analysis of Australian governmental national security policy 
planning during this period stressed that Gillard did a better job than Rudd in 
stabilizing Australian strategic posture and upgrading Canberra’s alliance with 
the U.S and keeping the U.S. engaged in Asia.53  
     These instances of praise were more than counteracted by often lacerating 
criticism of deficiencies documented by report critics. These included de- 
scribing a more positive strategic outlook than its 2009 predecessor without 
changing force structure other than adding extra electronic Growler aircraft; 
failing to match ends with means by not going beyond broad statements of 
objectives without explaining how to achieve such objectives through explicit 
domestic reforms, enhancing resource allocation to priority purposes, effective 
outreach within and beyond Australia, hedging strategies against future con- 
tingencies; and failing to deliver means matching ends and resources required 
for these capabilities.54 
     Additional criticisms of the 2013 White Paper included failing to justify 
the number of aircraft, ships, submarines, and battalions the government in- 
tends to purchase with taxpayer dollars; failing to link the activity of defense 
engagement with desired outcomes through a strategic concept; how seeking 
regional engagement relates to Australian defense; increased financial costs 
including choosing financially risky options to replace the troubled Collins 
class submarines and maintaining the F-A/18 F Super Hornet;  the soon to be 
acquired F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, and Growler electronic warfare aircraft 
means maintaining three different combat aircraft fleets in subsequent 
decades; failing to recognize that prior defense funding cuts will diminish 
Australia’s ability to address aerospace combat threats between 2020–2030 
and that aspiring to be a middle-ranked military power without realistic 
funding commitments is not sustainable; and failing to include operational 
planning for cyberwarfare in the white paper along with not articulating 
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operational planning for electronic warfare and electronic countermeasures 
into Australian military planning and strategy.55 
    Plans for a 2015 white paper, initiated by Abbott and Defense Minister 
Kevin Andrews (LIB-Menzies), began following the conservative coalition’s 
victory in the 2013 election. This paper’s release was delayed until 2016 for 
numerous reasons including turmoil within the governing Liberal Party 
personified by dissatisfaction with Abbott’s leadership style which resulted 
in him being toppled on September 14, 2015 by Malcolm Turnbull (LIB-
Wentworth) who became Prime Minister and appointed Senator Marisa 
Payne (LIB-NSW) as Defense Minister.56 
     This interim period provided frequent opportunity for those interested in 
Australian national security policy topics to make their recommendations on 
what the next Australian defense white paper should include and how the 
government should implement document contents into its national security 
policymaking. A 2014 Naval War College Review article noted that ADF 
operations had transitioned from the Middle East to the Asia-Pacific region 
due to shifting global economic power and strategic competition transitioning 
to this region, the increasing importance of Australian trade and investment 
in this region, and the U.S.’ shifting to the Asia-Pacific. During the Abbott 
Government’s early months in April 2014, an analysis from the security 
policy think-tank the Kokoda Foundation made the following points about 
what was expected to be a 2015 defense white paper including: 
 Being open about Australia’s worsening strategic environment and how 
the defense budget must provide force options for protecting large and grow- 
ing national interests and a roadmap for straightening out the defense budget 
and modernizing defense capabilities. 
 The next White Paper needs to make a clear choice about Australia’s 
future strategic role; design a defense force consistent with that role; commit 
necessary defense resources; provide sufficient industry and confidence to 
enable state government and the defense industry to support defense; and 
provide confidence that this white paper will be implemented and govern- 
mental commitment to it sustained. 
 Needs to address China’s military buildup and modernization while en- 
couraging Beijing’s peaceful rise and that regional strategic competition 
does not lead to conflict. 
 Stressing Australia’s desire to create and increase regional defense part- 
nerships enhancing regional security while addressing American desires that 
Australia enhance its regional security commitments and provide move overt 
support to the U.S. in the event of increased competition between the U.S. 
and China;  
 Ensuring Australian international defense engagement goals are based on 
a realistic assessment of strategic risk, a clear set of national defense objec- 
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tives, and a range of capabilities to advance these objectives augmented by 
short and long-term funds. 
 Emphasizing future defense technologies including microsystems, nano- 
technology, unmanned and autonomous systems, communications and sen- 
sors, digital technology, biological and material sciences, energy and power 
science, cognitive science, and neuro-technologies and their potential roles 
in future Australian defense capabilities.57 
     A 2015 assessment of Australian defense white papers by a prominent 
international affairs research institute analyst was scathing in its assessment 
of these documents declaring: 
 
Australia’s inability to clearly and succinctly define its defense 
strategy is a perennial failing that will have serious policy and 
operational consequences if not addressed. Australia’s recent 
defence white papers are part of the problem: they lack coherence, 
their messaging is poor, and many of their underlying assumptions 
and planning practices are questionable.58   
This assessment went on to advocate that the next white paper gave the 
Abbott Government the chance to reset Australian defense and military 
strategies. It advocated Australia replacing a maritime strategy with a “full 
spectrum” defense planning approach providing protection against military 
threats from space and cyberspace along with conventional air, land, and 
seapower threats. This document also stressed that full spectrum defense 
needed to be built on deeper and broader regional partnerships and by a risk 
assessment process encouraging critical thinking about strategy and future 
ADF capabilities.59 
    The proliferation of Internet technology, including social media such as 
blogs and Twitter, allows individual Australian political figures and defense 
oriented research institutions to comment on and attempt to influence Aus- 
tralian international relations and national security policymaking. Examples 
of Australian defense oriented blogs and discussion forums include the 
Institute for Regional Security (previously the Kokoda Foundation) http:// 
www.regionalsecurity.org.au/; the Lowy Institute’s Lowy Interpreter http:// 
www.lowyinterpreter.org/; the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) 
The Strategist http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/; Australian National Univer- 
sity’s Crawford School of Public Policy’s East Asia Forum http://www. 
eastasiaforum.org/about/; and this university’s New Mandala http://asia- 
pacific.anu.edu.au/newmandala/ focusing on Southeast Asian developments.  
An example of an individual blogger on national defense issues is The 
Murphy Raid http://andrewzammit.org/. Compiled and maintained by Univer- 
sity of Melbourne Ph.D. Candidate Andrew Zammit, this site, named for a 
raid on the Australian Security Intelligence Organization (ASIO) on March 
16, 1973 ordered by then Attorney General Lionel Murphy who suspected 
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ASIO of withholding information on terrorist threats and undermining the 
newly elected Gough Whitlam Government, features this writer’s comments 
on defense and security matters. Australian political figures with Twitter 
accounts providing insight on defense issues include Defense Minister and 
Senator Marise Payne https://twitter.com/MarisePayne; Senator Jacqui Lambie 
(IND-Tasmania) https://twitter.com/JacquiLambie; and Senator Peter Whish-
Wilson (GRN-Tasmania) https://twitter.com/SenatorSurfer. While it is debat- 
able how influential social media comment is in formulating Australian 
defense policy, there is a growing interest in using social media to advance 
or defeat various defense policy proposals.60 
    The Defense Department invited public submissions in a crowdsourcing 
initiative for desirable content to include in historic and contemporary defense 
white papers. It received 269 public submissions for the newest White Paper 
with 208 of those submitting material consenting to its publication.61 These 
submissions originate from multiple individuals and organizations represent- 
ing a variegated spectrum of perspectives on Australian national security 
issues. University of Queensland Senior Lecturer in International Relations 
Dr. Matt McDonald urged the Defence Department to develop a climate 
change strategy stressing his belief that climate change could impact homeland 
security resources; military capabilities; personnel well-being and procure- 
ment. He also urged the white paper examine how climate change could im- 
pact domestic and international disaster relief, large-scale regional population 
movements; and that the Defence Department and ADF integrate emissions 
reduction planning into their programs.62 
     The Sydney Aerospace & Defence Interest Group urged Australia to 
adopt international best practices for industry support and including strategic 
local sourcing as a long term policy; the Defence Department providing a 
clear statement of the critical capabilities required of local industries and 
linking this to the national defense strategy; providing a clear policy for 
sustaining defense acquisitions in the white paper; simplifying the defense 
contracting policy to make it less complex and costly for off-the-shelf and 
minor projects; and considering transferring defense industrial policy to the 
Department of Industry.63 
     Australia’s Northrup-Grumman subsidiary noted the rapidly changing and 
evolving international security technology environment urging the next white 
paper to explore the impact of evolving asymmetrical adversarial threat to 
satellite communication systems (SATCOM) on the full spectrum of military 
operations and exploring potential benefits of a national SATCOM system 
which is interoperable with the USAF’s protected SATCOM system.64 The 
Marrickville, NSW Peace Group presented a polemical treatise questioning 
the value of the Australian-U.S. alliance which it complained compromised 
Australian independence and national interests. This screed went on to claim 
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that the 2003 Iraq War violated international law, denounced the 2011 
stationing of U.S. Marines in Darwin, criticized embedding the ballistic 
missile frigate HMAS Sydney into the U.S. Seventh Fleet during 2013–2014; 
criticized Australian intelligence gathering and electronic surveillance coop- 
eration with the U.S. at the Pine Gap, and fretted about potential Australian 
military involvement in a confrontation with China.65 
     The Navy League of Australia stressed Australia’s historic and contem- 
porary role as a maritime nation and its critical dependence on imports and 
exports. Specific white paper recommendations made by this organization 
included Australian defense spending being at least 2% of GDP; that Aus- 
tralia be able to defend its air and sea space; that the military’s primary role 
is warfighting, that RAN surface and subsurface combat capabilities must be 
strengthened; that new submarines should be purchased and include land 
attack cruise missiles and mines; and that naval bases at Broome, Cairns, and 
Darwin be enhanced.66 
     The Returned & Services League (RSL), Australia’s primary veterans 
organization, stressed that main threats to national security include an uncer- 
tain global strategic outlook, weak economic forecasts for nations considered 
stable, the rise of quickly emerging mass civil disobedience movements 
assisted by social media causing governments to fall, ongoing tensions from 
nuclear proliferation and territorial disputes, and the rise of ISIS and other 
militant religious movements. RSL supported the U.S. rebalance to Asia but 
remains skeptical about its implementation, wants to improve ADF deficien- 
cies in housing and childcare which make retaining personnel problematic, 
expressed concern with spousal health insurance coverage want a service 
member retires, and urges that changes in military justice legislation conform 
to comparable civil law changes.67 
     In November 2015 ASPI released three consultation documents describing 
capabilities of individual ADF branches. The assessment for the RAAF 
mentioned it was recapitalizing its entire aircraft fleet from basic trainers to 
frontline tactical strike fighters. In addition, it noted the introduction of 
unmanned aerial systems and developing an intellectual framework for Air 
Operations known as Plan Jericho. Positive changes in RAAF capabilities 
since 2010 were noted in air control and strike, air mobility, intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance, and command and control. Capability defi- 
ciencies since 2010 were listed as being in air mobility and tactical battle- 
field airlift which were assessed as being low risk, antisubmarine warfare 
assessed as being medium to high-risk, and force generation and sustainment 
and fuel supply vulnerability which were assessed as being medium risk.68 
     ASPI’s RAN capability assessment stressed that RAN had legacy platforms 
in service such as Adelaide-class frigates which were past their peak but that 
new platforms, including combat helicopters, helicopter landing docks, 
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amphibious lift, and air warfare destroyers were being delivered and would 
provide capability enhancements. ASPI also noted plans to rebuild the fleet 
over the next couple of decades. Capability shortfalls stressed by this  
document include submarine capability which was judged as being medium 
risk, antisubmarine warfare assessed as being medium/high risk, and patrol 
and mine-hunting vessels evaluated at medium risk to due Armidale-class 
patrol boats serviceability declining as a result of extensive use in maritime 
border protection operations.69   
     ASPI’s Australian Army capability assessment mentioned that for the 
previous 15 years the Army’s focus has been on sustaining combat training, 
stabilization, and peacekeeping operations in adjacent regions and Mideast 
and Afghanistan theaters. These have placed demands on ADF operational 
tempo and begin a major rethinking of Army structure under Plan Beersheba 
which will involve three similar brigades make rotational deployments more 
manageable and sustainable. Positive Army capability changes noted since 
2010 include in artillery, small arms, personal protection, and ground and 
protected mobility. Static changes include armor capability, aviation, and 
command and control which may move into positive territory if new 
acquisitions such as CH-47 Chinook helicopters and systems digitization 
occur. Capability shortfalls include protected mobility and armored fighting 
vehicles which are assessed as medium risk; airborne armed reconnaissance 
assessed as medium to low risk; land-based air defense assessed as medium 
risk but will become more important due to proliferating armed drone 
systems; and lack of depth in specialized personnel in intelligence, medical, 
and combat support services assessed as medium risk.70 
    The 2016 defense white paper was released on February 25, 2016 by Turn- 
bull and Payne and broken into three parts including a conventional policy 
declaration, budget justification, and statement of defense industry capabil- 
ities. This document sought to describe Australian defense needs out until 
2035 while identifying security challenges likely to confront Australia while 
examining defense capabilities needed by the ADF and the Department of 
Defence to meet these threats. An executive summary of this document con- 
tended: 
 
While Australia has effective defence capabilities to draw on to 
meet current security challenges, significant under-investment in 
Defence in the past and the deferral of decisions about future 
major capabilities need to be fixed. Defence’s capability plans 
have become disconnected from defence strategy and resources, 
delaying important investments in Australia’s future security and 
frustrating Australian defence industry.71 
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Source: Australian Department of Defence 
 
Salient points addressed in the 2016 Defence White Paper included the Indo-
Pacific region providing 50% of the world’s economic output by 2050; a 
strong U.S. presence in the Asia-Pacific and globally has played a key role in 
promoting regional peace and security over the past 70 years; that while 
there is remote prospect of Australia being directly attacked by another 
country in the foreseeable future that Australian strategic planning is not 
limited to border defense, but must encompass the behaviors of countries 
and terrorists; and that terrorism will continue evolving in ways threatening 
Australian interests. This document also stressed that regional instability 
could have adverse strategic consequences; that Australia must maintain its 
technological edge and capabilities superiority which will be challenged by 
regional military modernization; that the next 20 years will see regional 
military forces operate with unprecedented range and precision; the excep- 
tional significance of Chinese military modernization; and that cyberattacks 
threaten the ADF’s warfighting capabilities, government agencies, and various 
sectors of Australia’s economy and critical infrastructure.72 
     Three key strategic defense emphases of the 2016 defense white paper 
include deterring, denying, and defeating attempts by hostile countries and 
non-state actors to threaten or coerce Australia by being able to decisively 
and independently respond to military threats such as incursions into Aus- 
tralia’s air, sea, and northern approaches; securing adjacent areas encompass- 
ing maritime Southeast Asia and the South Pacific; and building a stable 
Indo-Pacific region and rules-based global order supporting national interests 
by working closely with the U.S. Specific applications of these objectives 
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involve the agility, capability, and potency of the ADF; providing ADF with 
comprehensive situational awareness; strengthening defense intelligence, sur- 
veillance, and reconnaissance capabilities; enhancing cyber defense and the 
cyber workforce; increasing the submarine force from 6 to 12 with high 
interoperability with U.S. submarines; expanding surface naval capability 
with three Hobart class air warfare destroyers and a new class of nine future 
frigates supported by replenishment vessels; expanding combat aircraft 
capabilities with the F-35 A Lightning, F/A-18 Super Hornet, and E/A-18G 
Growler; and expanding land force capabilities with new generation armored 
combat reconnaissance and infantry fighting vehicles, a new long-range 
rocket system, adding drone aircraft to enhance land force surveillance and 
protection, and upgrading bases and ADF logistical capabilities.73 
     A supplemental volume to the white paper includes cost estimates for 
these defense aspirations called the Integrated Defence Investment Program.  
This document provides financial estimate for defense spending program 
areas encompassing future defense force capability, the defense work force, 
decision-making superiority; enabled mobile and sustainable forces; and 
coverage of areas such as air and sea lift; maritime and anti-submarine 
warfare; strike and air combat; and land combat and amphibious warfare.74 
 
Source: Australian Department of Defence 
 
Specific quantitative measurements indicated in the 2016 Integrated Invest- 
ment Program include $A195 billion ($144.992 billion) on defense spending 
through 2025–2026; increasing ADF workforce size to 62,400 between now 
and 2025–2026; and structuring defense spending in the following capability 
streams by 2025–2026: 
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Air and Sea Lift 6% 
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance, Electronic Warfare, Space, and Cyber 
Warfare 9% 
Key Enablers (Infrastructure Maximizing Force Effectiveness)  25% 
Maritime and Anti-Submarine Warfare 25% 
Strike and Air Combat 17% 
Land Combat and Amphibious Warfare 18%.75 
 
Additional budgetary spending targets projected for the ADF in the next 
decade and beyond include: 
 
Program Title Time Frame Approximate Investment 
Value 
Military Satellite Capability Approved $A507 million ($376.980 
million) 




High Altitude Unmanned Intelligence 
Surveillance and Reconnaissance 
System 
2017–2030 $A3-4 billion ($2.230.650–
$2.974.200 billion) 
Satellite Imagery Capability 2023–2039 $A 3–4 billion ($2.230.650–
$2.974.200 billion) 
Long-Range Electronic Warfare Support 
Aircraft 
2017–2024 $A 2–3 billion ($1.487.100–
$2.230.650 billion) 
Enhanced Jindalee Operational Radar 
Network 
2017–2026 $A 1–2 billion ($743.550 
million–$1.487.100 billion) 
Intelligence Systems 2016–2031 $A 2–3 billion ($1.487.100–
$2.230.650 billion) 
Space Situational Awareness System and 
Radars 
2018–2033 $A 1–2 billion ($743.550 
million–$1.487.100 billion) 
Distributed Ground Station Australia 2019–2029 $A 1–2 billion ($743.550 
million–$1.487.100 billion) 
Position, Navigation, and Timing Capability 2019–2033 $A 750 million–$1 billion 
($557.633–$743.550 million) 
Common Operating Picture Capability 
Program 
2017–2033 $A500–600 million 
($371.775–$446.130 million) 
Land-Based Geospatial Support Systems 2017–2025 $A 400–500 million 
($297.420–$371.75 million) 
Joint Electronic Warfare Integration 
Program 
2016–2033 $A 400-500 million 
($297.420–$371.75 million) 
Identification Friend or Foe and Automatic 
Dependent Surveillance Systems 
Scheduled for 
Approval 
$A 400–500 million 
($297.420–$371.75 million) 
Lead-In Fighter Training System 2022–2033 $A 4–5 billion ($2.974.200–
$3.717.750 billion) 
Garden Island Defence Precinct 
Redevelopment 
2017–2025 $A 500–700 million ($371.75 
million–$446.130 million) 
HMAS Cerburus Redevelopment 2016–2024 $A 400–500 million 
($297.420–$371.75million) 
New Northern Ordnance Explosives 
Storage Facility 
2017–2023 $A 300–400 million 
($223.065–$297.420 million) 




Defence Industry Policy Statement 
 
This document stresses areas in which Australia’s indigenous defense industry 
is capable of meeting ADF needs and which areas where it is not meeting 
Australian military needs. It is broken up into sections covering the partner- 
ship between the Department of Defence and the defense industry; a section 
on delivering defense capability and the proposed establishment of The Cen- 
tre for Defence Industry Capability; developing new approaches to defense 
innovation such as a Next Generation Technologies Fund and defense 
innovation hub and portal; driving competitiveness and export potential; and 
cutting red tape to enhance defense efficiency.77 
     This document notes Australian defense industry triumphs including de- 
veloping high-edge leading end phased array radar in Canberra, next-
generation protected Hawkei vehicles in Bendigo, VIC, and developing the 
F-35A Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter, and that approximately 3,000 small 
to medium enterprises support the Australian defense industry. Examples of 
these companies include the Western Australian company VEEM Ltd. provid- 
ing maintenance support for Special Air Service regiment Supacat vehicles, 
South Australia’s Levett Engineering manufacturing precision components for 
the Joint Strike Fighter and Collins submarine program; New South Wales 
Bales Defence Industries supplying weapons storage systems, and Victoria’s 
Sentient Vision Systems specializing in video analysis software and sur- 
veillance video small optic detection.78 
 
 
Source: Australian Department of Defence 
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The proposed Centre for Defence Industry Capability will receive funding of 
$A 230 million ($218.863 million) through 2025–2026; next generation 
technologies will be funded at $A 730 million ($694.653 million) during this 
time period, the defence innovation hub will be funded at $A640 million 
($609.011 million) during period; constructing surface warships will become 
a priority; a Defence Industrial Capability Plan, is supposed to be released in 
the second quarter of 2017; fuel management will become an increasing area 
of emphasis for ADF and the defense industry; and the Defence Innovation 
Portal is intended to enhance engagement between the Defense Department 
and innovation activities nationally. The Next Generation Technologies fund 
will prioritize the following areas: 
 Integrated Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance 
 Space Capabilities 
 Enhanced Human Performance 
 Medical Countermeasure Products 
 Multidisciplinary Material Sciences 
 Quantum Technologies 
 Trusted Autonomous Systems 
 Cyber 
 Advanced Sensors, Hypersonics and Directed Energy Capabilities.79 
 
Analysis and Reaction 
 
Australia has an extremely capable military and defense industry and its 
defense white papers have sought to incorporate Australian geopolitical,  
diplomatic, and military aspirations within the limits of economic resources 
and domestic political will. The 2016 Defense White Paper reflects Australia’s 
ambitions, but it remains to be seen whether Australia will be able to match 
and sustain its defense policy objectives in the years to come. An article in 
the conservative The Australian praised the white paper for producing a “sur- 
prisingly comprehensive military blueprint that-because it is costed-holds 
has a chance of becoming reality. This article also lauded the document for 
seeking to make Australia a muscular regional power by creating its most 
powerful naval force in peacetime. Additional approval of this document 
stressed its candid criticism of China’s military buildup and constructing 
artificial islands in the South China Sea, for Canberra’s commitment to 
spend 2% of GDP on defense, and for trying to align strategy, capability, and 
resources into a single document.80    
     Concerns expressed by The Australian included optimistic assumptions 
made on naval shipbuilding projects despite recent cost overruns and 
schedule delays in the program to build three new air warfare destroyers, not 
discussing how the ADF intends to recruit the extra 5,000 personnel it will 
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need to run its force of new warships, aircraft, and army equipment as its size 
increases to 62,400 in the next decade, the RAN needing to find crews to 
man its incoming boats, and finding money to lure engineers and technicians 
from the mining industry. Another assessment in this source observed that 
Indian and Pacific Ocean waters would be patrolled by more than 70 
Chinese submarines by 2020, the increasing deployment by Asian militaries 
of drones, longer range fighter aircraft, and ballistic missiles potentially 
capable of threatening Australian territory including China’s CSS-4 and DF-
31 and North Korea’s Taepodong-2. A third assessment from this source 
stressed the importance of the ADF having intelligence capabilities to monitor 
threats from submarines, Mideast and Asia-Pacific terrorism, and cyber 
warfare against government agencies and industry.81 
     Early parliamentary reaction to the 2016 White Paper was varied. On 
February 25, 2016, Prime Minister Turnbull stressed that Australia’s security 
was the government’s highest priority stressing that this document desired to 
enhance Australian military power across land, sea, and air and it would 
enhance Australian capabilities in these areas along with being fully costed, 
enhancing, tow force resilience, geared toward enhancing the Australian 
defense industry by enhancing spending within Australia. Foreign Minister 
Julie Bishop (LIB-Curtin) stressed that the white paper would enable Aus- 
tralia to develop deeper partnerships with the U.S. and other national allies, 
strengthen Australian defense cooperation and presence in Southeast Asia, 
the South Pacific, and Northeast Asia, and in areas including counterterrorism, 
maritime security, science and technology, intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance, and maintaining a rules-based international order.82 
     On February 29, 2016, Rep. Tony Zappia (LAB-Makin) criticized the 
delays in releasing the white paper and expressed concern on behalf of his 
South Australian constituents that this document contained no guarantees 
about when submarines and offshore patrol vessels will be built. He also 
complained that shipping construction commitments were election promises 
that the government could not be trusted to deliver on.83 Parliamentary 
debate on March 2, 2016 saw Labour Party leader Rep. Bill Shorten (LAB-
Maribyorng) question Turnbull about newspaper reports concerning leaked 
national security documents concerning the timing of the future deployment 
of Australian submarines mentioning former Prime Minister Abbott who 
denied leaking the documents. Turnbull replied that the Australian Federal 
Police had started an investigation into this leak.84        
     Finally, a March 4, 2016 Lowy Institute paper criticized the white paper 
for not specifying how increased defense spending will be paid for and asked 
whether this would occur from selling tax increases and other governmental 
expenditure savings in an environment of increasing demands on social ser- 
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vices and health costs, an eroding tax base, and projections of slowing global 
economic growth.85 
     The following tables quantify Australian defense spending in U.S. dollars, 
as share of GDP, and personnel size from 2010–2015 encompassing both 
Rudd Governments, and the Gillard, Abbott, and Turnbull governments.  
 
Australian Defense Spending 2010–2015 U.S. Dollars 
2010 $26.993 billion 
2011 $26.597 billion 
2012 $25.665 billion 
2013 $25.442 billion 
2014 $27.171 billion 
2015 $22.764 billion86 
 








Australian Military and Civilian Workforce June 30, 2013–June 30, 2015  
Royal Australian Air Force 13,934 14,076 +142 
Australian Army 28,568 29,366 +798 
Royal Australian Navy 13,862 14,070 +208 
Australian Public Service (APS) Dept. of 
Defence Civilian Workforce 




Australian power projection is dependent on the logistical need to cover 
great distances to reach operational theaters since its landmass consists of 
7,682,300 square kilometers, its water area encompasses 58,920 square kilo- 
meters, and its coastline encompasses 25,760 square kilometers. Australia’s 
population was 24,022,042 on March 9, 2016.89 Due to significant quantities 
of the Australian landmass being covered by the desert outback, the majority 
of Australia’s population is located on the Boomerang Coast covering from 
Queensland to parts of South Australia incorporating the eastern and south- 
eastern parts of the country. This is demonstrated by the states of Queens- 
land, New South Wales, Victoria, and South Australia having a June 30, 






New South Wales 7,618,200 
Victoria 5,938,100 
Queensland 4,779,400 
South Australia 1,698,600 
Western Australia 2,591,600 
Tasmania 516,600 
Northern Territory 244,600 
Australian Capital Territory 390,80090 
 
This population concentration along Australia’s Boomerang Coast is reflected 
in this map of Australian military bases: 
 
   
Source: Australian Dept. of Defence 
 
The phrase “The Tyranny of Distance” has been used by the eminent Aus- 
tralian historian Geoffrey Blainey to describe Australia’s traditional geographic 
distance from most of the world’s economic and strategic markets. However, 
this isolation has lessened in an era of globalization, precision guided muni- 
tions, ballistic missiles, and Internet connectivity including cyber warfare. It 
is 3,419 miles from Australia’s largest city Sydney to Jakarta, Indonesia; 
5,542 miles from Sydney to Beijing; 4,842 miles from Sydney to Tokyo; 
5,155 miles from Sydney to Seoul; and 4,814 miles from Sydney to Hanoi.  
This technological diminishing of distance makes Australia increasingly 
vulnerable to security threats such as disorder in Pacific Islands nations such 
as the Solomon Islands, illegal airborne and seaborne mass migration, dis- 
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ruptions in trade routes in the South China Sea and Malacca Straits, North 
Korean ballistic missiles, and increasing Chinese military spending and 
assertiveness. All of these factors are producing an increased emphasis on 
greater international security cooperation by Australia and have been incor- 
porated into the 2016 defense white paper and must be recognized by current 
and future Australian national security policymakers.91 
     These security developments, including the threat of Islamist terror demon- 
strated by the December 15–16, 2014 hostage crisis at Sydney’s Martin Place 
Lindt Chocolate café hear the Reserve Bank of Australia, provide ample jus- 
tification for Australia increasing its defense spending and security vigilance. 
This justification is further amplified by Asia and Australasia representing 
22.8% of world global defense spending in 2015; Asian defense spending 
increasing nearly 6% annually between 2013–2015; Chinese defense spend- 
ing increasing 19.8% in 2014–2015; Chinese cruiser, destroyer, and frigate 
strength reaching 73; Beijing’s tactical aircraft fleet of 1,084; and Chinese 
defense spending representing 41% of Asian and Australasian countries 
defense spending.92 
     Australia probably has the economic resources to sustain the defense 
spending advocated in the 2016 defense white paper. However, there are 
problems within Australian government and politics that make successful 
sustainment of these defense spending commitments problematic. The first is 
the short-term nature of Australia’s electoral cycle. Australian federal elections 
are held at least every three years and may be held more frequently if 
requested by the Prime Minister and approved by the Governor-General.  
This makes sustaining long-term governmental and public commitment for 
programs uncertain.93 
     A more serious problem has been chronic political volatility and inter- 
necine factional fighting within Australia’s governing parties the Labour Party 
and the Liberal-National Party coalition since 2007 when Labour defeated 
the Coalition Government of John Howard which served from 1996–2007.  
During Labour’s 2007–2013 administration, Prime Minister Kevin Rudd was 
toppled by Julia Gillard on June 23–24, 2010 and Gillard would eventually 
toppled by Rudd on June 25, 2013. Rudd and Labour would go on to lose the 
September 7, 2013 election to the Coalition lead by the new Prime Minister 
Tony Abbott. However, Abbott would encounter increasing dissatisfaction 
within Coalition ranks about his leadership style and would be toppled by 
Malcolm Turnbull on September 14, 2015 giving Australia five Prime 
Ministers in an eight year period. Such governmental volatility is more 
reflective of a dysfunctional developing country instead of one the world’s 
most advanced democracies, economies, governments, and militaries. In 
addition, the three year mandate for parliamentary elections means Australia 
will have another parliamentary election sometime during 2016.94 
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     Australia also faces economic challenges in meeting the ambitious defense 
spending objectives set out in the 2016 defense white paper. While it had a 
GDP of $1.455 trillion in 2014, its economic growth rates have fluctuated 
increasing 2.7% in 2011; 3.6% in 2012; 2.4% in 2013; 2.5% in 2014, and 
2.2% in 2015, and its economic growth is heavily dependent on exports; 
particularly minerals to export markets such as China and Japan which rank 
as Australia’s two largest trading partners with the following Asia-Pacific 
countries South Korea, Singapore, New Zealand, Thailand, Malaysia, and 
India ranking among Australia’s top ten leading trading partners.95 
     China’s current economic difficulties have decreased Beijing’s demand 
for Australian natural resources which has resulted in declining commodity 
prices and had an adverse impact on Australian government revenues. In 
December 2015, Australian Treasurer Scott Morrison (LIB-Cook) released 
the Mid-Year Economic and Fiscal Outlook 2015–16. This document stressed 
that Australia’s budget deficit is expected to decline from $A 37.4 billion 
($27.907 billion) (2.3% of GDP) in 2015–2016 to $A14.2 billion ($10.595 
billion (0.7% of GDP) in 2018–2019 and that net national debt is expected to 
peak at 18.5% of GDP in 2017–2018 and then decline in the medium term.  
Additionally economic growth of 2.75% was forecast in 2016–2017 due to 
historically low interest rates, a falling Australian dollar, lower oil prices, and 
increasing Australian economic diversification away from resource investment-
led growth. This growth could be achieved if government projections of 
unemployment falling from 6% in 2014 to 5.5% by 2018–2019 are correct 
and with implementation of the Trans-Pacific Partnership and free trade 
agreements with China, Japan, and South Korea.96 
     Australia’s commitment to spend 2% of its GDP on defense is laudable, 
but this NATO benchmark has been criticized for not measuring burden 
sharing or quantifying risk sharing. A Carnegie Europe study noted that 
Greece spends more than 2% of its GDP on defense, but that its military is 
unable to project significant force across time and space. During the apogee 
of NATO’s 2012-surge in Afghanistan, Greece had just 160 troops represent- 
ing 1.2% of allied forces and by December 2014 Athens only had 9 troops 
representing .02% of the 41,000 NATO force in Afghanistan. In contrast, 
Denmark has spent approximately 1.5% of its GDP on defense since 2000.  
However, Denmark’s highly capable and deployable military contributed 750 
military forces at the height of the Afghanistan surge and maintained 130 
personnel in theater at the end of 2004. Copenhagen also contributed seven 
of the 185 aircraft involved in NATO’s Operation Unified Protector against 
Libya in 2011 as opposed to just five Greek aircraft. Effective analysis of 
military spending should also include metrics such as force deployability 
capability and the ability of armed forces to engage in sustained military 
operations.97 
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     The $22.764 billion of Australian defense spending is dwarfed by the 
government’s 2015–2016 social services portfolio budget of $A 154 billion 
($115.434 billion) and health expenditures of $A 69.4 billion $51.784 billion 
representing over 49% of Australia’s $A 434.5 billion ($324.215 billion) 
government budget for 2015–2016 as broken down by this pie chart.98  
 
Source: Australia Commonwealth Treasurer 
 
Australian military forces need agility, flexibility, and striking power to defeat 
aggression and instability threats from multiple sources including turmoil in 
adjoining Pacific Island nation states, threats to critical supply lines such as 
the South China Sea, cyber attacks, and illegal immigration which could be 
used as a means for infiltrating Islamist terrorists to augment Islamist cells.  
During 2014–2015, the Australian Federal Police (AFP) conducted eight 
operations resulting in 25 individuals being charged with terrorism and other 
offenses. AFP also announced that the Syria–Iraq conflict is of particular 
concern as it is causing an increasing number of Australians to fight in this 
conflict and return to Australia radicalized and willing to conduct operations 
on Australian soil. This conflict also places Australians traveling to South- 
east Asia at greater risk to terrorist attack.99 
     The ADF also needs to bolster its ballistic missile defenses against 
emerging threats from China and North Korea, enhance its submarine assets 
to deal with the increasing presence of Chinese submarines in Indo-Pacific 
Ocean waters, and maintain its commitment to building and maintaining 
RAAF capabilities in fighter, interceptor, and intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance aircraft to defend its airspace. Enhancing the striking power 
and survivability of its Army is also critical as is maintaining an agile and 
robust intelligence infrastructure to deal with emerging national security 
threats from foreign and indigenous sources. 
     Australia also needs to strengthen the ANZUS pact to incorporate it into 
emerging Asian relationships and institutions. This would enhance Australia’s 
regional posture and make it a more effective U.S. ally with particular regional 
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expertise. Canberra could help China find ways to enhance its integration 
into the regional order and adhere to international norms. The U.S. has 
encouraged greater defense cooperation between Australia, India, Japan, and 
South Korea working with these countries to counterbalance Chinese asser- 
tiveness in the East and South China Seas. Intelligence cooperation between 
the U.S. and Australia as part of the Five Eyes Network whose membership 
also consists of Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom continues 
increasing. The U.S. must be careful not to take Australian support for 
granted in the event of a security crisis with China, while recognizing that 
Asian countries having concerns about U.S. regional staying power due to 
America’s deteriorating economics and political conflict between Congress 
and the President.100 
   The Turnbull Government’s 2016 defense white paper has a laudable and 
realistic vision of the emerging strategic environment facing Australia. It was 
produced through a transparent process inviting and receiving significant 
public feedback. This document’s willingness to back this up with resources 
and support for Australia’s defense industry is commendable. It remains to 
be seen whether Turnbull or later Australian Prime Ministers of both govern- 
ing parties are willing and able to sustain this commitment to enhancing the 
ADF given the continuing public demand for domestic social programs by 
going against public opinion for additional government sustenance by 
trimming such programs or slowing their funding growth. Ending internecine 
intraparty strife is crucial for stability in Australian national security policy- 
making, as is some level of bipartisan agreement on Canberra’s national 
security objectives and role in the world. Civilian and military Australian 
national security policy analysts and policymakers will engage in ongoing 
reviews and updates of domestic and international economics, public opinion, 
military capabilities and trends, to determine if Australia’s 2016 defense white 




     1. See Craig Beutel, “Formulating the 2015 Defence White Paper.” Australian 
Defence Force Journal, 196 (March/April 2015): 18–26; http://www.adfjournal. 
adc.edu.au/UserFiles/issues/196%202015%20Mar_Apr.pdf; (accessed January 14, 
2016); Derek McDougall. “Australian Strategies in Response to China’s Rise: The 
Relevance of the United States.” Asian Survey, 54(2)(March/April 2014): 319–342; 
DOI: 10.1525/as.2014.54.2.319; Rory Medcalf. “In Defence of the Indo-Pacific:  
Australia’s New Strategic Map.” Australian Journal of International Affairs, 68(4) 
(2014): 470–483; DOI: 10.1080/10357718.2014.911814; and Paul Kirk. “Concep- 
tualising ‘Defense of Australia’ in the 21st Century.” Australian Defence Force 
Journal, 197 (July/August 2015): 80–87; http://www.adfjournal.adc.edu.au/User 
Files/issues/197%202015%20Jul_Aug.pdf; (accessed January 14, 2016). 
 57 
     2. See U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook, (Washington, DC:  
2015); https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/as.html; 
(accessed January 15, 2016); T. Prior; D. Giurco, G. Mudd, L. Mason, and J. 
Behrisch, “Resource Depletion, Peak Minerals and the Implications for Sustainable 
Resource Management,” Global Environmental Change, 22(3)(2012): 577–587; 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2011.08.009; Ian W. McLean, Why Australia 
Prospered: The Shifting Sources of Economic Growth, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2012); and Ross Garnaut, Dog Days: Australia After the Boom, 
(Collingwood, VIC: Redback, 2013); Pui-Kwan Tse, “The Mineral Industry of Aus- 
tralia,” 2013 Minerals Yearbook Advance Release, (Reston, VA: U.S. Geological 
Survey, 2015): http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/country/2013/myb3-2013-
as.pdf; (accessed January 15, 2016); and Australian Bureau of Statistics, Population 
Clock, (Canberra: Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2016): 1; http://www.abs.gov.au/ 
ausstats/abs%40.nsf/94713ad445ff1425ca25682000192af2/1647509ef7e25faaca256
8a900154b63?OpenDocument; (Accessed March 15, 2016). 
     3. See The World Factbook, and Australia, Department of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade, Australia’s Trade Balance to November 2015, (Canberra: Department of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2016): http://dfat.gov.au/trade/resources/trade-statistics/ 
Pages/australias-trade-balance.aspx; (accessed January 15, 2016). 
     4. Examples of this proliferating literature include Frank Broeze, Island Nation:  
A History of Australians and the Sea, (Crows Nest, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 1998); 
Alex Tewes, Laura Rayner, and Kelly Kavanaugh, A Foundation Paper on Aus- 
tralia’s Maritime Strategy, (Canberra: Australia Parliamentary Library, 2004); 
http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/House_of_Representati
ves_Committees?url=jfadt/maritime/report.htm#fullreport; (Accessed March 12, 2016); 
Michael Evans, The Tyranny of Dissonance: Australia’s Strategic Culture and Way 
of War, 1901–2005, (Duntroon: Australian Army Land Warfare Studies Centre, 2005); 
http://www.army.gov.au/~/media/Files/Our%20future/LWSC%20Publications/SP/sp
306_Tyranny_of_Dissonance-Michael%20Evans.pdf; (accessed January 15, 2016); 
Steven Paget. “Old but Gold: The Continued Relevance of Naval Gunfire Support 
for the Royal Australian Navy.” Security Challenges, 10(3)(2014): 73–94; www. 
regionalsecurity.org.au/Resources/Files/SC10-3%20Paget.pdf; (accessed January 15, 
2016); Albert Palazzo, The Future of War Debate in Australia: Why Has There Not 
Been One? Has the Need for One Arrived? (Duntroon: Australian Army Land 
Warfare Studies Centre, 2012.) http://www.army.gov.au/~/media/Files/Our%20 
future/LWSC%20Publications/WP/pdfs/WP140-The-Future-of-War-Debate-in-
Australia.pdf; (accessed January 15, 2016); and Naval Diplomacy and Maritime 
Power Projection: Proceedings of the Royal Australian Navy Sea Power Conference 
2013, Andrew Forbes, ed., (Canberra: Royal Australian Navy Sea Power Centre, 
2014).  http://www.navy.gov.au/spc/sites/default/files/publication-documents/SP13.pdf; 
(accessed January 15, 2016); and Peter Sheehan, “The End of the Mining Boom” 
Ecodate, 29 (1)(March 2015): 4–6. 
     5. See Stephan Frühling, A History of Australian Strategic Policy since 1945, 
(Canberra: Department of Defence, 2009): http://www.defence.gov.au/Publications/ 
docs/StrategicBasis.pdf; (accessed February 18, 2016); and Paul Dibb, “The 
Importance of the Inner Arc to Australian Defence Policy and Planning,” Security 
 58 
Challenges, 8(4)(Summer 2012): 14; http://www.regionalsecurity.org.au/Resources 
/Files/Vol8No4Dibb.pdf; (accessed February 18, 2016). 
     6. See Australia, Department of Defence, Australian Defence, (Canberra: Aus- 
tralian Government Publishing Service, 1976): 1–2; http://www.defence.gov.au/ 
Publications/wpaper1976.pdf; (accessed January 20, 2016); and Peter J. Dean, 
“Amphibious Operations and the Evolution of Australian Defense Policy,” Naval 
War College Review, 67(4)(Autumn 2014): 26; https://www.usnwc.edu/getattach 
ment/712c4ef5-84cf-4ef8-87e0-f92d8faee6e9/Amphibious-Operations-and-the-
Evolution-of-Austral.aspx; (Accessed April 19, 2016). 
     7. Ibid., 10. 
     8. Ibid., 10–59. 
     9. See Graeme Cheeseman, “Australia’s Defence: White Paper in the Red,” Aus- 
tralian Journal of International Affairs, 44(2)(1990): 101; DOI: 10.1080/103577 
19008445024; and Ibid., “From Forward Defence to Self-Reliance: Changes and 
Continuities in Australian Defence Policy, 1965–1990,” Australian Journal of 
Political Science, 26(3)(1991): 434–435; DOI: 10.1080/00323269108402160; and 
Dibb, “The Importance of the Inner Arc to Australian Defence Policy and Planning,” 
Security Challenges, 8(4)(Summer 2012): 14, 22; http://www.regionalsecurity.org. 
au/Resources/Files/Vol8No4Dibb.pdf; (accessed January 20, 2016). 
     10. Paul Dibb, Review of Australia’s Defence Capabilities, (Canberra: Depart- 
ment of Defence, 1986): vii; http://www.defence.gov.au/se/publications/defreview 
/1986/Review-of-Australias-Defence-Capabilities-1986.pdf; (accessed January 22, 
2016). 
     11. Ibid., vi–vii. 
     12. Ibid., 1–16. 
     13. See Peter Samuel and Colin Rubenstein, “Australia Next?,” The National 
Interest, 5(Fall 1986): 56–59; www.jstor.org/stable/42894450; (accessed January 
22, 2016); Andrew Mack, “Defence versus Offence: The Dibb Report and Its Critics,” 
Australian Outlook, 41(1)(1987): 1, 3–9; DOI:10.1080/10357718708444925; and 
Alan Dupont, “Transformation or Stagnation?: Rethinking Australia’s Defence,” Aus- 
tralian Journal of International Affairs, 57(1)(2003): 55–76; DOI: 10.1080/103577 
1032000073641. 
     14. Australia, Department of Defence, The Defence of Australia 1987, (Canberra:  
Department of Defence, 1987): vii–viii, http://www.defence.gov.au/Publications/ 
wpaper1987.pdf; (accessed February 1, 2016). 
     15. Ibid., viii–ix. 
     16. Hugh White, Beyond the Defence of Australia: Finding a New Balance in 
Australian Strategic Policy, (Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2006):  
45; http://www.lowyinstitute.org/files/pubfiles/White%2C_Beyond_the_defence_of 
_Australia.pdf; (accessed February 3, 2016), 
     17. Cheeseman, 103. 
     18. Australia, Parliament, House of Representatives, Hansard, 154(May 4, 1987):  
2545–2547; http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/chamber/hansardr/1987-05-
04/toc_pdf/H%201987-05-04.pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf#search=%221980s% 
201987%20defence%20of%20australia%22; (accessed February 3, 2007). Downer 
 59 
would later serve as Australia’s Foreign Minister during John Howard’s Coalition 
Government from 1996-2007. 
     19. Australia, Department of Defence, Defending Australia: Defence White Paper 
1994, (Canberra: Department of Defence, 1994): 7; http://www.defence.gov.au/ 
Publications/wpaper1994.pdf; (accessed February 3, 2016). 
     20. Ibid., 150–166. 
     21. Paul Dibb, “The Self-Reliant Defence of Australia: A History of an Idea,” in 
History as Policy:  Framing the Debate on the Future of Australia’s Defence Policy, 
Ron Huisken and Meredith Thatcher, eds., (Canberra: Australian National Univer- 
sity E-Press, 2007): 20; http://www.oapen.org/download?type=document&docid= 
459265#page=27; (accessed February 3, 2016). 
     22. Stefan Markowski and Peter Hall, “Country Survey VI: Australia,” Defence 
and Peace Economics, 6(2)(1995):  89–114; DOI:10.1080/10430719508404817. 
     23. Australia, Parliament, House of Representatives, Hansard, 198(December 7, 
1994): 4202–4207; http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/chamber/hansardr/ 
1994-12-07/toc_pdf/H%201994-12-07.pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf#search=% 
221990s%201994%20defending%20australia%22; (accessed February 3, 2016). 
     24. Australia, Department of Defence, Australia’s Strategic Policy, (Canberra:  
Department of Defence, 1997): 10; http://www.defence.gov.au/minister/sr97/ 
SR97.pdf; (accessed February 11, 2016). 
     25. Ibid., 7. 
     26. Ibid., 8. 
     27. Australia, Parliament, House of Representatives, Hansard, 218 (December 2, 
1997): 11836; http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/chamber/hansardr/1997 
-12-02/toc_pdf/H%201997-12-02.pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf#search=%22199 
0s%201997%20australian%20strategic%20policy%22; (accessed February 11, 2016). 
     28. See Russell Trood, “Perspectives on Australian Foreign Policy 1997,” Aus- 
tralian Journal of International Affairs, 52(2)(1998): 188; DOI: 10.1080/103577 
19808445249; A.W. Robert Ayson, “The ‘Arc of Instability’ and Australia’s 
Strategic Policy,” Australian Journal of International Affairs, 61(2) (June 2007):  
215–231; DOI: 10.1080/10357710701358360; and Grazebrook, A.W., “Australia’s 
Strategic Policy – A Cause for Concern,” Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter, XXIV(2), 
February–March 1998. 
     29. See United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1264 (1999), (United 
Nations: Security Council, September 15, 1999): http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/ 
view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1264%281999%29; (accessed February 10, 2016); and 
Adam Cobb, East Timor and Australia’s Security Role: Issues and Scenarios, (Can- 
berra: Department of the Parliament Library, 1999): http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/ 
parlInfo/download/library/prspub/6QF06/upload_binary/6QF06.pdf;fileType=applic
ation/pdf#search=%22current%20issues%20BRIEFS%20%201990s%201999%22; 
(accessed February 10, 2016); and “East Timor Peacekeeping Mission to Conclude,” 
(Canberra: Australian Army, 2015): http://www.army.gov.au/Our-work/News-and-
media/News-and-media-2012/News-and-media-December-2012/East-Timor-peace- 
keeping-mission-to-conclude; (accessed February 10, 2016). 
     30. See Alan Ryan, From Desert Storm to East Timor: Australia, the Asia-
Pacific, and ‘New Age’ Coalition Operations, (Duntroon: Australian Army Land 
 60 
Warfare Studies Centre, 2000): http://www.army.gov.au/~/media/Files/Our%20 
future/LWSC%20Publications/SP/sp302_Desert_Storm_to_East_Timor-Alan%20 
Ryan.pdf; (accessed February 10,2016); Alan Dupont, “Transformation or Stag- 
nation?: Rethinking Australia’s Defence,” Australian Journal of International Affairs, 
57(1)(2003): 65; DOI:10.1080/1035771032000073641; David Kilcullen, The Acci- 
dental Guerilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One, (New York:  
Oxford University Press, 2009): 189–209; and East Timor Intervention: A Retro- 
spective on INTERFET, John Blaxland, ed. (Melbourne: Melbourne University 
Publishing, 2015). 
     31. Australia, Department of Defence, Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force, 
(Canberrra: Department of Defence, 2000): 29–32, 46–52; http://www.defence.gov. 
au/publications/wpaper2000.PDF; (accessed February 15, 2016). 
     32. Ibid., 11. 
     33. Ibid. XVII; Australia, Parliament, House of Representatives, Hansard, (7 
February 2001): 24171, 24166. http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/ 
chamber/hansardr/2001-02-07/toc_pdf/942-1.pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf# 
search=%22defence%20%20%20our%20future%20defence%20force%22; (accessed 
February 15, 2016); and Ibid., (February 28, 2001): 24736–24737; http://parlinfo. 
aph.gov.au/parlInfo/genpdf/chamber/hansardr/2001-02-28/0148/hansard_frag.pdf; 
fileType=application%2Fpdf; (accessed February 15, 2016). 
     34. Stewart Woodman, “Not Quite the Full Monty?: Analysing Australia’s 2000 
Defence White Paper,” Australian Journal of International Affairs, 55(1)(2001):  
29–30; DOI:10.1080/10357710120055058. 
     35. Hugh White, “Australian Defence Policy and the Possibility of War,” Austral- 
ian Journal of International Affairs, 56(2)(2002): 253–264; DOI: 10.1080/10357710 
220147451. 
     36. Alan Dupont, “Transformation or Stagnation?: Rethinking Australia’s 
Defence,” Australian Journal of International Affairs, 57(1)(2003): 55–76; DOI:10. 
1080/1035771022000073641. 
     37. Pertinent works on these developments include Australia, Department of 
Defence, The War In Iraq: ADF Operations in the Middle East in 2003, (Canberra:  
Australian Department of Defence, 2003(?): http://www.defence.gov.au/Publications 
/Docs/Lessons.pdf; (accessed February 17, 2016); Peter Connolly, Counterinsur- 
gency in Uruzgan 2009, (Canberra: Australian Army Land Warfare Studies Centre, 
2011): http://www.army.gov.au/~/media/Files/Our%20future/LWSC%20Publica- 
tions/SP/sp321_Counterinsurgency_in_Uruzgan_2009-Peter%20Connolly.pdf; 
(accessed February 17, 2016); Lloyd Cox and Brendan O’Connor, “Australia, the 
U.S., and the Iraq and Vietnam Wars: ‘Hound Dog, Not Lap Dog,’” Australian 
Journal of Political Science, 47(2)(2012): 173–187; DOI:10.1080/10361146.2012. 
677004; James Brown, “What Did We Learn from the War in Afghanistan?,” 
(Sydney: The Lowy Institute, October 30, 2013): 1–3; http://www.lowyinstitute. 
com/files/brown_what_did_we_learn_from_the_war_in_afghanistan.pdf; (accessed 
February 17, 2016); Kevin Foster, “Going Dutch or Candidly Canadian?: What the 
ADF Might Learn from its Allies Media Operations Practices in Afghanistan,” 
Security Challenges, 11(1)(2015): 1–19; http://regionalsecurity.org.au/Resources 
/Documents/11-1%20-%20Foster.pdf; (accessed February 17, 2016); and Anthony 
 61 
Bergin and Carl Claxton, “Shock Without Awe: Military Lessons of the Regional 
Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands,” PRISM: A Journal of the Center for 
Complex Operations, 5(3)(2015): 160–173; http://cco.ndu.edu/Portals/96/Docu- 
ments/prism/prism_5-3/Shock_without_awe.pdf; (accessed February 17, 2016). 
     38. Australia, Department of Defence, Going to the Next Level: The Report of the 
Defence Procurement and Sustainment Review, (Canberra: Department of Defence, 
2008): vii, xi; http://www.defence.gov.au/publications/mortimerreview.pdf; (accessed 
February 17, 2016). 
     39. Ibid., xi–xiv. 
     40. Australia, Department of Defence, Defending Australia in the Asia-Pacific 
Century: Force 2030, (Canberra: Department of Defence, 2009): 34–42; http:// 
www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper/2009/docs/defence_white_paper_2009.pdf; 
(accessed February 18, 2016). 
     41. Ibid., 70–79. 
     42. Australia, Parliament, House of Representatives, Hansard, 13(8 September 
2009): 8897, 8907–8908; http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/chamber/ 
hansardr/2009-09-08/toc_pdf/7090-4.pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf#search=%22 
defending%20australia%20house%20of%20representatives%22; (accessed February 
18, 2016). 
     43. Patrick Walters, “The Making of the 2009 Defence White Paper,” Security 
Challenges, 5(2)(Winter 2009): 2–3; http://www.regionalsecurity.org.au/Resources 
/Files/vol5no2Walters.pdf; (accessed February 19, 2016). 
     44. Allan Behm, “Australian Strategic Policy in the Age of Uncertainty,” Security 
Challenges, 5(2)(Winter 2009): 12–14; http://www.regionalsecurity.org.au/Re- 
sources/Files/vol5no2Behm.pdf; (accessed February 19, 2016). 
     45. Hugh White, “A Wobbly Bridge: Strategic Interests and Objectives in Force 
2030,” Security Challenges, 5(2)(Winter 2009): 21–29; http://www.regionalsecurity. 
org.au/Resources/Files/vol5no2White.pdf; (accessed February 19, 2016). 
     46. See Australia, Department of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, Australia in 
the Asian Century, (Canberra: Department of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, 
2012): 223–246; http://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper/2013/docs/australia_in_the 
_asian_century_white_paper.pdf; (accessed February 29, 2016); and Paul Kelly, 
Triumph and Demise: The Broken Promise of a Labor Generation, (Melbourne:  
Melbourne University Publishing, 2014). 
     47. See Arvind Gupta, “Australia in the Asian Century: Australian Government’s 
White Paper, Strong and Secure: A Strategy for Australia’s National Security,” 
Strategic Analysis, 34(4)(2013): 505–509; DOI:10.1080/09700161.2013.802526; 
Robyn Sampson, “Mandatory, Non-Reviewable, Indefinite: Immigration Detention 
in Australia,” in Immigration Detention: The Migration of a Policy and its Human 
Impact, Amy Nethery and Stephanie J. Silverman, eds., (New York: Routledge, 
2015): 104–113. 
     48. See Australia, Department of Defence, Defence White Paper 2013: Defending 
Australia and Its National Interests, (Canberra: Australia Department of Defence, 
http://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper/2013/docs/WP_2013_web.pdf; (accessed Feb-
ruary 29, 2016); and Mark Thomson, “Defence Funding in 2013: Means, Ends and 
 62 
Make Believe,” Security Challenges, 9(2)(2013): 51–53; http://www.regional 
security.org.au/Resources/Files/SC9-2Thomson.pdf; (Accessed March 2, 2016). 
     49. Ibid., 35–51, 71–89. 




dr/9876e2b9-5961-455f-aa38-455af1c59cb8/0000%22; (Accessed March 2, 2016). 
     51. Ibid., 3156. 
     52. Australian Electoral Commission, The Official 2013 Federal Election Results, 
(Canberra: Australian Electoral Commission, 2013): http://results.aec.gov.au/174 
96/Website/Default.htm; (Accessed March 2, 2016). 
     53. See Brendan Taylor, “The Defence White Paper 2013 and Australia’s Stra- 
tegic Environment,” Security Challenges, 9(2)(2013): 16; http://www.regional 
security.org.au/Resources/Files/SC9-2Taylor.pdf; (Accessed March 2, 2016); Michael 
L. Estrange, “International Defence Engagement: Potential and Limitations,” Security 
Challenges, 9(2)(2013): 27; http://www.regionalsecurity.org.au/Resources/Files/ 
SC9-2L'Estrange.pdf; (Accessed March 2, 2016); Benjamin Schreer, “Business as 
Usual?: The 2013 Defence White Paper and the US Alliance,” Security Challenges, 
9(2)(2013): 36–37; http://www.regionalsecurity.org.au/Resources/Files/SC9-
2Schreer.pdf; (Accessed March 2, 2016); Peter Leahy, “The Future for Land Forces,” 
Security Challenges, 9(2)(2013): 61; http://www.regionalsecurity.org.au/Resources 
/Files/SC9-2Leahy.pdf; (Accessed March 2, 2016); James Goldrick, “The Future for 
Maritime Forces,” Security Challenges, 9(2)(2013): 61; http://www.regionalsecurity. 
org.au/Resources/Files/SC9-2Goldrick.pdf; (Accessed March 2, 2016); Nick Jans, 
“The ‘People’ Perspective,” Security Challenges, 9(2)(2013): 101–102; http://www. 
regionalsecurity.org.au/Resources/Files/SC9-2Jans.pdf; (Accessed March 2, 2016); 
and Alan Bloomfield, “To Balance or to Bandwagon?: Adjusting to China’s Rise 
During Australia’s Rudd-Gillard Era,” The Pacific Review, 29(2)(May 2016): 278; 
DOI:10.1080/09512748.2015.1013497 
     54. See Peter Jennings, “The Politics of Defence White Papers,” Security Chal- 
lenges, 9 (2)(2013): 14; http://www.regionalsecurity.org.au/Resources/Files/SC9-
2Jennings.pdf; (Accessed March 2, 2016); and L’Estrange, 23–24. 
     55. See Stephan Frühling, “The 2013 Defence White Paper: Strategic Guidance 
Without Strategy,” Security Challenges, 9(2)(2013): 43, 45–46; http://www.regional 
security.org.au/Resources/Files/SC9-2Fruehling.pdf; (Accessed March 2, 2016); 
Mark Thomson, “Defence Funding in 2013: Means, Ends, and Make Believe,” 
Security Challenges, 9(2)(2013): 54–55; http://www.regionalsecurity.org.au/Re- 
sources/Files/SC9-2Thomson.pdf; (Accessed March 2, 2016); John Blackburn, “The 
Future for Aerospace Forces,” Security Challenges, 9(2)(2013): 72, 74; http://www. 
regionalsecurity.org.au/Resources/Files/SC9-2Blackburn.pdf; (Accessed March 2, 
2016); and Desmond Ball and Gary Waters, “Cyber Defence and Warfare,” Security 
Challenges, 9(2)(2013): 95; http://www.regionalsecurity.org.au/Resources/Files/SC 
9-2BallandWaters.pdf; (Accessed March 2, 2016). 
     56. Peter Van Onselen and Wayne Errington, Battleground: Why the Liberal 
Party Shirtfronted Tony Abbott, (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2015). 
 63 
     57. See Dean, 32; and Gary Waters, Pressing Issues for the 2015 Defence White 
Paper, (Kingston, ACT: The Kokoda Foundation, 2014): 7–9, 12; http://www. 
regionalsecurity.org.au/Resources/Documents/DP01WhitePaperReportWeb.pdf; 
(Accessed March 4, 2016). 
     58. Alan Dupont, Full Spectrum Defence: Re-thinking the Fundamentals of Aus- 
tralian Defence Strategy, (Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2015): 1; 
http://www.lowyinstitute.org/files/full-spectrum-defence.pdf; (Accessed March 7, 2016). 
     59. Ibid. 
     60. See Sam Roggeveen, “New Media and Australia’s National Security Debate,” 
Security Challenges, 11(1)(2015): 21–37; http://www.regionalsecurity.org.au/Re- 
sources/Documents/11-1%20-%20Roggeveen.pdf; and John Charles Blaxland, Protest 
Years: Volume 2: The Official History of ASIO, 1963-1975, (Crows Nest, NSW:  
Allen & Unwin, 2015). 
     61. Australia, Department of Defence, Public Submissions, (Canberra: Depart- 
ment of Defence, 2016); http://www.defence.gov.au/WhitePaper/PublicSubmis- 
sions.asp; (Accessed March 4, 2016). 
     62. Individual Submission to the Defence White Paper Consultation Process, 7th 
August 2014, http://www.defence.gov.au/WhitePaper/docs/003-McDonald.pdf; 
(Accessed March 4, 2016). 
     63. NSW Industry Workshop Report Defence White Paper 2015, (2014: 3–4; 
http://www.defence.gov.au/WhitePaper/docs/006-SydneyAerospaceDefenceInterest 
Group.pdf; (Accessed March 4, 2016). 
     64. Northrup Grumman Australia WP 15 Defence White Paper Submission, 3–4; 
http://www.defence.gov.au/WhitePaper/docs/026-NorthropGrumman.pdf; (Accessed 
March 4, 2016). 
     65. Marrickville Peace Group, Questioning the Value of the Australia/US Alliance, 
http://www.defence.gov.au/WhitePaper/docs/071-MarrickvillePeaceGroup.pdf; 
(Accessed March 4, 2016). 
     66. Submission for the Defence White Paper 2015 by the Navy League of Aus- 
tralia, (2015): 1–9; http://www.defence.gov.au/WhitePaper/docs/123-NavyLeagueof 
Australia.pdf; (Accessed March 4, 2016). 
     67. 2015 Australian Defence White Paper Submission by The Returned & Ser- 
vices League of Australia, (2014): 1–10; http://www.defence.gov.au/WhitePaper/ 
docs/125-ReturnedServicesLeague.pdf (Accessed March 4, 2016). 
     68. See Andrew Davies, ADF Capability Shapshot: 2015: Part 1-RAAF, Stra- 
tegic Insights 97 (Barton, ACT: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2015): 1–3; 
https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/adf-capability-snapshot-2015-part-1raaf/SI97_ 
ADF_capability_snapshot_2015_RAAF.pdf; (Accessed March 4, 2016); Peter 
Hartley, Joint Command and Control of Australian Airspace, Australian Defence 
Force Journal, 197(July/August 2015): 62–72; http://www.adfjournal.adc.edu.au/ 
UserFiles/issues/197%202015%20Jul_Aug.pdf; (Accessed March 4, 2016); and Royal 
Australian Air Force, Plan Jericho: Jericho Program of Work and Plan Jericho 
Booklet, 2015; http://www.airforce.gov.au/plan-jericho/?RAAF-CrI57877JHUU/bo9 
YoJ64qWYIO7G/14Q; (Accessed March 4, 2016). For the biblical origins of Jericho 
as a military operational venue, see The Holy Bible, Joshua 6:1–24; NIV Edition.  
 64 
     69. Andrew Davies. “ADF Capability Snapshot: Part 2-RAN,” Strategic Insights, 
99 (Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2015); 1–3; https://www.aspi. 
org.au/publications/adf-capability-snapshot-2015-part-2-ran/SI99_ADF_capability_ 
snapshot_2015_RAN.pdf; (Accessed March 4, 2016). 
     70. See Andrew Davies. “ADF Capability Snapshot: Part 3-Army,” Strategic 
Insights, 100 (Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2015); 1–3; https:// 
www.aspi.org.au/publications/adf-capability-snapshot-2015-part-3army/SI100_ADF 
_capability_snapshot_2015_Army.pdf; (Accessed March 4, 2016); John Caligari, 
“The Adaptive Army Post-Afghanistan: The Australian Army’s Approach toward 
Force 2030,” Security Challenges, 7(2)(Winter 2011): 1–6; http://www.regional 
security.org.au/Resources/Documents/vol7no2Caligari.pdf; (Accessed March 4, 2016); 
and Australian Army, Plan Beersheba, (Canberra: Australian Army, 2015): http:// 
www.army.gov.au/Our-future/Projects/Plan-BEERSHEBA; (Accessed March 4, 
2016). See Paul Daley, Beersheba: A Journey Through Australia’s Forgotten War, 
(Melbourne: Melbourne University Publishing, 2009); for the significance of 
Beersheba in Australian military strategic planning having its provenance in the 4th 
Australian Horse Light Brigade’s October 31, 1917 capture of the Ottoman strong- 
hold of Beersheba (now in Israel) following a six kilometer cavalry charge across 
open ground. 
     71. Australia, Department of Defence, 2016 Defence White Paper, (Canberra:  
Department of Defence, 2016): 10; http://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper/Docs/ 
2016-Defence-White-Paper.pdf; (Accessed March 7, 2016). 
     72. Ibid., 14–16. 
     73. Ibid., 17–20. 
     74. Ibid., 2016 Integrated Investment Program, (Canberra: Department of 
Defence, 2016); 3–4; http://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper/Docs/2016-Defence-
Integrated-Investment-Program.pdf; (Accessed March 7, 2016). 
     75. Ibid., 9, 21. 
     76. Ibid., 36, 60–62. 
     77. Ibid., 2016 Defence Industry Policy Statement, (Canberra: Department of 
Defence, 2016); 2–3; http://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper/Docs/2016-Defence-
Industry-Policy-Statement.pdf; (Accessed March 8, 2016). 
     78. Ibid. 5, 8–9. 
     79. Ibid., 11–12, 20, 23, 26, 30, 32. 
     80. Cameron Stewart, “Muscling Up,” The Australian, (February 26, 2016): 11. 
     81. See Ibid.; “The Reach of North Korea’s Ballistic Missiles,” (Washington, DC:  
Heritage Foundation, 2015): http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/infographics/2015 
/02/SR-military-power-index-2015-north-korea-missiles_HIGHRES.jpg; (Accessed 
March 10, 2016); James Brown, “Tougher Defence is Realistic in Face of a Rising 
and Rearming China,” The Australian, (February 26, 2016): 12; Brendan Nicholson, 
“Intelligence Missions to Run Deep and Wide,” The Australian, (February 26, 2016):  
6; and U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and 
Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, 2015, (Washing- 
ton, DC:  DOD, 2015): 88;  http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2015 
_China_Military_Power_Report.pdf; (Accessed March 10, 2016). 
 65 




edc8a%2F0000%22; (Accessed March 15, 2016). 
     83. Ibid., (February 29, 2016): 45; http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/dis- 
play/display.w3p;db=CHAMBER;id=chamber%2Fhansardr%2F3e7fc91c-2a08-485 
3-95e3-77e2c5b615c5%2F0104;query=Id%3A%22chamber%2Fhansardr%2F3e7fc 
91c-2a08-4853-95e3-77e2c5b615c5%2F0000%22; (Accessed March 15, 2016). 
     84. Ibid., (March 2, 2016): 54; http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display 
/display.w3p;db=CHAMBER;id=chamber%2Fhansardr%2F563b33e2-7088-4c58-9 
ed7-833adbfece13%2F0117;query=Id%3A%22chamber%2Fhansardr%2F563b33e2 
-7088-4c58-9ed7-833adbfece13%2F0000%22; (Accessed March 15, 2016). 
     85. Nick Bisley, “How Will We Pay For this Big-Spending Defence White Paper,” 
(Sydney: The Lowy Institute, March 4, 2016): 1–2; http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/ 
post/2016/03/04/How-will-we-pay-for-this-big-spending-Defence-White-Paper.aspx; 
(Accessed March 9, 2016). 
     86. See Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Military Expenditure 
Database. (Stockholm: SIPRI, 2016). http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/ 
milex/milex_database; (Accessed March 9, 2016); and The Military Balance 2016, 
(London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 2016): 486; DOI:10.1080/0459 
7222.2016.1127641. 
     87. Ibid., Military Expenditure Database and Ibid., The Military Balance 2016, 
486. 
     88. Australia, Department of Defence, Defence Annual Report 2014–2015: Volume 
1 Performance, Governance, and Accountability, (Canberra: Department of Defence, 
2015): 127–128; http://www.defence.gov.au/annualreports/14-15/downloads/DAR_ 
2014-15_Vol_1.pdf; (Accessed March 9, 2016). 
     89. See U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook, (Washington, 
DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 2015): 1; https://www.cia.gov/library/publica- 
tions/the-world-factbook/geos/as.html; (Accessed March 9, 2016); Australian 
Bureau of Statistics, Population Clock, (Canberra: Australian Bureau of Statistics, 
2016): 1; http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs%40.nsf/94713ad445ff1425ca2568200 
0192af2/1647509ef7e25faaca2568a900154b63?OpenDocument; (Accessed March 
9, 2016; and D.T. Rowland, “Theories of Urbanization in Australia,” Geographical 
Review, 67(2)(April 1977): 167–176; DOI: 10.2307/214018. 
     90. Ibid., Australian Demographic Statistics: June 2015, (Canberra: Australian 
Bureau of Statistics, December 17, 2015): 1; http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@ 
.nsf/mf/3101.0; (Accessed March 9, 2016). 
     91. See Geoffrey Blainey, The Tyranny of Distance: How Distance Shaped Aus- 
tralia’s History, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1968); Distance Calculator: How 
Far Is It?, (Stavenger, NO: Time and Date AS, 2016): http://www.timeanddate. 
com/worldclock/distance.html; (Accessed March 9, 2016), Craig A. Snyder, 
“Australia–Malaysia Security Cooperation as Pivotal Component for More Stable 
Bilateral Relations,” Asian Politics & Policy, 7(3)(July 2015): 379–393; DOI: 
10.1111/aspp.12197; Chris Brookes, Cyber Security: Time for an Integrated Whole-
 66 
of-Nation Approach in Australia,  (Canberra: Australian Defence College, Centre for 
Defence and Strategic Studies, 2015): http://uat.defence.gov.au/ADC/Publications/ 
IndoPac/150327%20Brookes%20IPS%20paper%20-%20cyber%20(PDF%20final). 
pdf; (Accessed March 10, 2016); Australia, Department of Immigration and Border 
Protection, Annual Report 2014–2015, (Belconnen, ACT: Department of Immigration 
and Border Protection, 2015): 2–3; http://www.border.gov.au/ReportsandPublica- 
tions/Documents/annual-reports/DIBP-Annual-Report-2014-15.pdf; (Accessed March 
10, 2016); Jae Jeok Park and Hyun Chung Yoo, “The Resilience of the U.S.–Aus- 
tralia Alliance: Does a (Potential) China Threat Provide a Rationale for the Alliance?, 
The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, 27(4)(December 2015): 417–434; Bonnie 
Glaser, “High Stakes for Australia in Limiting China’s South China Sea Incursions,” 
Ausmarine, 37(9)(July 2015): 18; and Tomohiko Satake, “The Japan-Australia 
Contribution to a Liberal and Inclusive Regional Order: Beyond the ‘China Gap,’” 
Australian Journal of International Affairs, 70(1)(2016): 24–36; DOI:10.1080/103 
57718.2015.1077501. 
     92. See Australia, Department of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet and New 
South Wales Government Premier and Cabinet, Martin Place Siege: Joint Com- 
monwealth New South Wales Review, (Canberra: Department of the Prime Minister 
and the Cabinet, 2015): https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/docu- 
ments/1672780/martin-place-siege-joint-commonwealth-new-south.pdf; (Accessed 
March 10, 2016): and The Military Balance 2016, 19–20, 23, 215; DOI:10.1080/04 
597222.2016.1127562 and 10.1080/04597222.2016.1127567. 
     93. Australia, Parliamentary Educational Office, Parliament and Congress: A 
Comparison of the Australian and United States Federal Political Systems, (Can- 
berra: Parliamentary Education Office, 2015?;): 5; http://www.peo.gov.au/uploads/ 
peo/docs/closer-look/CloserLook_Parliament-and-Congress.pdf; (Accessed March 
10, 2016). 
     94. Janet Wilson, Prime Ministers and ALP Leadership Challenges Update, (Can- 
berra: Australia Parliamentary Library, 2012): 1–2; http://www.aph.gov.au/About_ 
Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/FlagPost/2012/Febru
ary/Prime_ministers_and_ALP_leadership_challenges_update; (Accessed March 10, 
2016); Cathy Madden, Prime Ministers and Recent Liberal Party Leadership Chal- 
lenges, (Canberra: Australia Parliamentary Library, 2015): 1–2; http://www.aph. 
gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/FlagP
ost/2015/September/Prime_ministers_and_leadership_challenges; (Accessed March 
10, 2015). 
     95. See McLean, World Bank, Data: Australia, (Washington, DC: The World 
Bank, 2016): 1; http://data.worldbank.org/country/australia; (Accessed March 10, 
2016); and Australia, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australia’s Trade in 
Goods and Services by Top 15 Partners 2014–15, (Canberra: Department of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade, November 25, 2015): 1; http://dfat.gov.au/about-us/publica- 
tions/trade-investment/australias-trade-in-goods-and-services/Pages/australias-trade-
in-goods-and-services-2014-15.aspx; (Accessed March 10, 2016). 
     96. Australia, Treasurer of the Commonwealth of Australia, Mid-Year Economic 
and Fiscal Outlook 2015–2016, (Canberra: Treasurer of the Commonwealth, 2015):  
 67 
1–4; http://www.budget.gov.au/2015-16/content/myefo/download/MYEFO_2015-
16_Final.pdf; (Accessed March 10, 2016). 
     97. John Deni, Burden Sharing and NATO’s 2 Percent Goal, (Brussels: Carnegie 
Europe, 2015): 1–3; http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/?fa=59767; (Accessed 
March 10, 2016). 
     98. See Australia, Department of Social Services, Portfolio Budgets Statements 
2015–16 Budget Related Paper NO. 1.15A Social Services Portfolio, (Canberra:  
Department of Social Services, 2015): 8; https://www.dss.gov.au/sites/default/files/ 
documents/06_2015/2015-16_dss_pbs.pdf; (Accessed March 10, 2016); and Aus- 
tralia, Treasurer of the Commonwealth, Budget: 2015 Overview, (Canberra:  Treasurer 
of the Commonwealth, 2015): 30; http://www.budget.gov.au/2015-16/content/over- 
view/download/Budget-2015-Overview.pdf; (Accessed March 10, 2016). 
     99. Australian Federal Police, Annual Report 2014–15, (Canberra: Australian 
Federal Police, 2015):  35–41; http://www.afp.gov.au/~/media/afp/pdf/a/afp-annual-
report-2014-2015.pdf; (Accessed March 10, 2016). 
     100. See Elsina Wainwright, Australia and the US Asian Alliance Network, 
(Sydney: The United States Studies Centre at the University of Sydney, 2016):   
http://ussc.edu.au/ussc/assets/media/docs/publications/Alliance21/Australia%20and
%20the%20US%20Asian%20alliance%20network%20HI%20RES.pdf; (Accessed 
April 19, 2016); and Patrick F. Walsh, “Building Better Intelligence Frameworks 
through Effective Governance,” International Journal of Intelligence and Counter- 
intelligence, 28(1)(2015): 123–142; DOI:10.1080/08850607.2014.924816.  
    
 
